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All Fire Department of the city of New York (FDNY) strategic plans have been 
formulated using the same process, implemented in the post-9/11 environment. The 
process must be assessed to ensure it supports the FDNY’s mission in an environment 
that has significantly changed and continues to evolve.  
Since September 11, 2001, significant weather events, including blizzards, 
hurricanes, and Super Storm Sandy, have challenged the FDNY’s capabilities and 
magnified the threat of global climate change. Terrorism keeps evolving; the use of fire 
as a weapon and active shooter tactics push the boundaries of the FDNY’s response 
paradigms. Its core responsibilities are changing, with fire-related incidents dropping 
steadily and medical incidents rising significantly.   
The FDNY has risen to all these challenges, analyzing and adapting to threats, 
innovating and adopting new technology, improvising and adjusting tactics, and 
modifying and amending operations. However, in the twelve years since its first strategic 
plan, strategic planning at the FDNY has not evolved to include a long-term perspective 
with future-oriented goals and effective performance metrics to stay ahead of the 
evolving environment. Implementing the recommendations in this thesis will re-align and 
update the process, incorporating current concepts that will improve FDNY strategic 
planning now and in the future. 
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After the unimaginable tragedy of 9/11, the Fire Department of the City of New 
York (FDNY) began a top-to-bottom assessment of the entire Department’s response and 
what it revealed about its ability to respond to all-hazard events. Despite the enormity of 
the tragedy, the FDNY recognized the opportunity to change and grow. Organizations 
rarely have a chance to rebuild in an environment of almost universal political and 
financial support. The tragedy of 9/11 forced the FDNY to critically examine the entire 
organization, honestly and realistically gauge its capabilities, and identify the dramatic 
changes necessary to adequately respond to unknown and asymmetric all-hazards threats 
in the future. Formulating a strategy to implement these changes was a top priority.  
The City of New York and the FDNY commissioned world-renowned consultants 
McKinsey & Company to conduct a study of the Department’s response on 9/11 and 
make recommendations for how to improve its preparedness in the future.
1
 One of 
McKinsey & Company’s recommendations was to enhance planning and management 
processes by creating “a formal Annual Plan, consisting of clear objectives, along with 
initiatives designed to meet those objectives.”2 The FDNY embraced and expanded on 
this recommendation, producing five strategic plans to date, in addition to several bureau 
plans and Department-wide concept documents.  
(1) Problem Statement and Research Question 
All of the FDNY strategic plans have been formulated using the same process, 
implemented in the post-9/11 environment. The process must be assessed to ensure it 
supports the FDNY’s mission in an environment that has significantly changed and 
continues to evolve. This thesis answers the question: how well did the FDNY develop 
and implement a formal strategic planning process in the context of their unique 
operating environment after September 11, 2001, and what changes are required to ensure 
                                                 
1 Daniel Shacknai and Meta Ribowsky, “History of Strategic Planning at FDNY,” WNYF, 2011, 14. 
2 McKinsey & Company, Increasing the FDNY’s Preparedness (New York: McKinsey & Company, 
August 19, 2002), 77, http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/mck_report/toc.shtml. 
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its relevance in current and future environments? This thesis clarifies what policy/process 
modifications are required to improve the FDNY’s strategic planning process. 
(2) Review and Analysis 
The formulation and application of a strategic planning process grew out of the 
McKinsey report prepared for the FDNY just after 9/11 and was used to create all FDNY 
strategic plans to date. The process is reviewed, along with a report prepared for the 
FDNY by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG). The plans each produced and several 
bureau or command strategic plans are detailed.   
The analysis begins with the creation of a baseline strategic planning process and 
the weighting of its elements: components and characteristics. The FDNY process is 
compared to the baseline process, the BCG Project Axiom process to the baseline 
process, and the FDNY process to the BCG Project Axiom process. Results are 
categorized by the impact they would have on the total planning process if improved. 
Precipitating factors and motivators are subjectively identified, as are the costs, benefits, 
obstructions, and impact of maintaining, eliminating, improving, or implementing the 
element at the FDNY.   
(3) Recommendations 
Recommendations are formed based on the analysis and interpretation of their 
overall positive impact to the strategic planning process, relative costs, and the perceived 
effort required to implement them. They are sorted within functional categories used 
throughout this thesis: pre-formulation, formulation, planning, implementation, and 
management, with the exception of characteristics, which are incorporated into the 
category they most impact. Implementing these recommendations will align the FDNY 
strategic planning process elements with those in the preferred strategic planning process.   
(4) Conclusions 
The all-hazard environment in which the FDNY operates continues to evolve after 
9/11. Significant weather events and terrorism push the boundaries of the FDNY’s 
response paradigms. Its core responsibilities are changing, with fire-related incidents 
 xvii 
dropping steadily and medical incidents rising significantly. Additionally, the FDNY 
continues to experience mission creep into other domains of public service. The 
Department has risen to all these challenges, adapting to threats and amending operations 
when needed. However, in the twelve years since its first strategic plan, strategic 
planning at the FDNY has not evolved to include a long-term perspective with future-
oriented goals and effective performance metrics. 
Current theories on strategic planning consider the planning process itself as more 
important to the organization than the plans they produce. By improving strategic 
thinking, the FDNY can develop the important combination of creative and analytical 
perspective in leaders and managers to synthesize strategies for its future. The 
recommendations all focus on improving the strategic planning process and strategic 
thinking. Implementing them will allow the Department to create more effective strategic 
plans and encourage strategic thinking now and in the future. The revised process that 
results can serve as a template for strategic planning in other public service agencies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, were a seminal event for the United 
States. They changed the world as we knew it, and ushered in a threat environment we 
had never experienced. This was especially true for those who live and work in New 
York City, and no more so than for the Fire Department of the City of New York 
(FDNY).  
The combination of planes striking the twin towers of the World Trade Center and 
their subsequent collapse killed over 2,800 innocent people. Cantor Fitzgerald, an 
investment bank occupying several floors of the North Tower, lost 658 employees. Marsh 
Inc., also located in the North Tower, lost 295 employees and 63 consultants. The FDNY 
as an organization suffered the next biggest loss of life, with 343 members killed in the 
line of duty that day, all of whom responded to the scene after the attack.1  
The significant number of experienced senior firefighters, executive managers, 
and inspirational leaders among the victims compounded the FDNY’s loss. The attack 
killed the first deputy commissioner, the chief of department, the chief of hazardous 
materials (HazMat) operations, and the FDNY chaplain—all revered throughout the 
department—dealing a devastating blow to the FDNY’s organizational continuity and 
collective psyche. One thousand more firefighters than usual retired within two years 
after 9/11, some due to disability secondary to the attacks, and some due to increased 
pensions as a result of overtime incurred during the recovery.2   
Despite the enormity of the tragedy, the FDNY recognized the opportunity to 
change and grow. Organizations rarely have a chance to rebuild in an environment of 
almost universal political and financial support. The tragedy of 9/11 forced the FDNY to 
critically examine the entire organization, honestly and realistically gauge its capabilities, 
and identify the dramatic changes necessary to adequately respond to unknown and 
                                                 
1 “9/11 by the Numbers,” New York Magazine, September 15, 2002, http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/
sept11/features/n_7692/.  
2 The New York City Retirement System (NYCERS) did not grant a waiver to change pension 
calculations from “last three years” to “highest three years.” See Appendix A. 
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asymmetric all-hazards threats in the future. Formulating a strategy to implement these 
changes was a top priority.  
Prompted by a recommendation in the 2002 McKinsey & Company report 
Increasing the FDNY’s Preparedness, the FDNY formalized a strategic planning process 
that led to its first strategic plan in 2004.3 For the first time, the FDNY published a high-
level, future-focused, organization-wide plan delineating strategic goals, setting up 
benchmarks to achieve them, and incorporating a review process to ensure the 
benchmarks were met and the goals remained relevant and desired. The FDNY continues 
this process today, having now produced five successive strategic. In 2012, they 
commissioned the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) to analyze the Department and make 
recommendations for the future. This thesis examines the processes that produced the 
McKinsey and BCG reports and all five strategic plans in the fifteen years since 
September 11, 2001. 
The researcher hopes to honor those who made the ultimate sacrifice that fateful 
day by sharing the findings, conclusions, and recommendations to improve the process 
with other public service/response agencies so they may use this analysis to replicate the 
successes and learn from the shortcomings of the FDNY strategic planning process. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Reeling from the unimaginable disaster of 9/11, and facing a new and formidable 
threat, the FDNY had to recover, rebuild, and realign its focus to this new threat 
environment while maintaining high standards of performance in its broad existing 
mission. The FDNY must perform as a high reliability organization4 due to the low-
probability/high-consequence risk environment in which it operates and the life-and-
death implications of its daily operations. And it must do so in New York City, which 
                                                 
3 McKinsey & Company, Increasing the FDNY’s Preparedness (New York: McKinsey & Company, 
2002), 77, http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/mck_report/toc.shtml. 
4 High reliability organizations “have no choice but to function reliably. If reliability is compromised, 
severe harm results.” Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected: Resilient 
Performance in an Age of Uncertainty (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), ix. 
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“remains a primary terrorist target due to its size, concentration of significant critical and 
economic infrastructure, and stature as an icon of the nation’s history and ideals.”5  
The FDNY strategic plans were formulated using the process implemented in the 
immediate post-9/11 environment. The strategic plans themselves have garnered much 
attention over these years, but the process of creating them has not. The strategic plan 
creation process—for the first report or any succeeding reports—has never been analyzed 
for effectiveness, despite the evolving environment. The FDNY strategic planning 
process must be assessed to ensure it produces plans that facilitate the FDNY’s ability to 
meet its mission in the dynamic, evolving domains in which the FDNY operates.   
Strategic planning as a discipline has evolved significantly since the FDNY first 
embraced it. New theories and studies have discovered the impact of the strategic 
planning process is often significantly more important than the strategic plan itself in 
improving organizational performance.6 They have also highlighted ways the strategic 
planning process can positively influence other parts of the organization by exposing 
employees to strategic planning concepts and by encouraging strategic thinking, learning, 
and awareness.   
The process of strategic planning is difficult and expensive, requiring significant 
time commitment from leaders, managers, planners, and those responsible for 
implementing the plan throughout the organization. The analysts must mine the 
appropriate data and synthesize it into useful information based on a deep understanding 
of the organization and its environment. Many fire departments and other public service 
agencies have implemented a strategic planning process, and very few studies address 
their effectiveness. Many public agencies, still, would like to implement a strategic 
planning process but do not have the resources to explore different approaches until they 
find one that works.   
                                                 
5 Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP), Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 
Strategy (New York: FDNY, 2007), 9.  
6 Eton Lawrence, Strategic Thinking: A Discussion Paper (Halifax, NS: Public Service Commission of 




B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND DESIGN 
This thesis answers the question: How well did the FDNY develop and implement 
a formal strategic planning process in the context of their unique operating environment 
after September 11, 2001, and what changes are required to ensure its relevance in 
current and future environments? This thesis clarifies what policy/process modifications 
are required to improve the FDNY’s strategic planning process. 
(1) Selection Criteria 
All five of the FDNY strategic plans and one external study were the selected 
samples. The BCG Project Axiom report was included, as it is more of a strategic plan 
than a report; and the McKinsey report was excluded, as it is more of a gap analysis than 
a strategic plan. Selection of process elements was based on their significance as 
identified in scholarly writings, peer-reviewed studies, and articles on strategic planning 
in the public sector, or as cited by prominent authors.  
(2) Data Sources 
The primary data sources consisted of published open-source documents, 
including the strategic plans themselves, annual reports, FDNY statistical data, and 
published descriptive accounts. Secondary data sources included academic studies and 
theses, and literature on strategy, strategic planning, and associated topics. Additional 
data sources included internal FDNY documents and specific data provided by relevant 
bureaus, commands and units of the FDNY. 
(3) Type and Mode of Analysis 
A multi-goal policy analysis methodology was used to answer the research 
question. The research included a comprehensive review of the extensive strategic 
planning literature and its associated topics, including the strategic planning process, 
strategic thinking, strategy formulation, strategic plan formulation and implementation, 
and strategic management. In-depth reviews of the strategic planning process at the 
FDNY and all five strategic plans it produced, as well as the process that created the 
McKinsey report and the BCG Project Axiom report, followed.  
 5 
A baseline strategic planning process was created for analysis, and the processes 
used to create each of the plans were compared against it, as was the plan each produced. 
Findings of each comparison were then contrasted against each other. Variations between 
the plans and the baseline, in addition to variations between the plans, were considered 
variables in the subjective analysis conducted of each. Conclusions and recommendations 
were posited based on the subjective analysis, including these variables.  
(4) Purpose 
This research intended to identify strategic planning process elements to continue, 
eliminate, improve, or implement in the FDNY strategic planning process; the outcome 
contributes to the study of strategic planning in public service/response agencies due to 
its scope and environment. The FDNY has a 150-year history, and is the largest fire 
department serving the largest population in the United States.7 Rebuilding and 
realigning an emergency response agency of this size after its devastating loss on 9/11 is 
unprecedented. This analysis provides a unique retrospective understanding of how, why, 
and how well the FDNY implemented strategic planning under those circumstances and 
afterward. The findings and recommendations provide both positive and negative 
examples for other public service/response agencies that are considering developing or 
updating their strategic planning processes.   
(5) Limitations 
The researcher acknowledges the variability present in selecting a qualitative 
study of this nature, the ambiguity in the comparative analysis and the subjective measure 
of comparative alignment, as well as the potential for both personal and professional bias 
as a high-ranking member of the FDNY. The researcher is a reflective emergency 
response practitioner with thirty-three years of direct experience who understands the 
environment and the organization, and has compared the FDNY strategic planning 
process to what the scholars and literature identify as important.    
                                                 
7 “Ten U.S. Cities Now Have 1 Million or More People/ California and Texas Each Have Three of 
These Places,” U.S. Census Bureau, May 21, 2015, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/
cb15-89.html. 
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The finite amount of scholarly research and peer-reviewed studies on the 
effectiveness of strategic planning in the public sector limits the comparative analysis of 
the desired steps and organizational characteristics relative to the strategic planning 
process.   
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II presents an in-depth review of the literature on strategy, strategy 
formulation, and strategic planning, and their associated concepts. Chapter III 
comprehensively reviews strategic planning in the FDNY since September 11, 2001, 
including the process used to formulate the five FDNY strategic plans and two external 
reports commissioned by the FDNY, in addition to the plans and reports themselves. 
Chapter IV is a qualitative analysis of the strategic planning process at the FDNY and 
how it compares to a preferred process extrapolated from the literature and to one of the 
external reports. Chapter V interprets the analysis results, including a subjective cause-
and-effect relationship. Chapter VI provides recommendations to continue, eliminate, 
improve, or implement components or characteristics of the strategic planning process at 
the FDNY.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on strategy and strategic planning and their associated concepts is 
incredibly broad and deep, dating back to 500 BC with Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.8 The 
concept has been used extensively in the military since then, and made its way into the 
business world in the 1950s.9 The Department of Defense implemented the Planning-
Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) in the 1960s, which spawned several 
adaptations in the public sector, mainly at the state level. The use of strategic planning in 
the private sector has exploded since, and its use in the public sector has grown steadily, 
but at a much slower pace.   
This literature review is presented in four parts. First is a review of the origins, 
definitions, and relative perspectives on strategy. Next is a review of the many 
perspectives on how strategy is formulated and how it actually forms in organizations. 
Third is a deeper review of strategic planning concepts, including the strategic planning 
process and plan formulation, and strategic management. Finally, the fourth part presents 
conclusions. 
A. STRATEGY 
The word strategy derives from the Greek “στρατηγία” (strategia), “office of 
general, command, generalship.”10 The tribes in ancient Greece elected a strategos to 
head their regiment of soldiers. The strategoi “gave ‘strategic’ advice about managing 
battles to win wars, rather than ‘tactical’ advice about managing troops to win battles.”11 
The etymology infers a broader perspective than tactics, and therefore a higher level of 
thinking.  
                                                 
8 Marylynn Placet and Kristi Branch, “Management Benchmark Study,” Air University, June 8, 2002, 
1, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/doe/benchmark/. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Henry George Lidell and Robert Scott, “A Greek-English Lexicon: Στρα^τηγ-ία,” Tufts University, 
accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/
text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dstrathgi%2Fa. 
11 Phillip Blackerby, “History of Strategic Planning,” Armed Forces Comptroller, Winter (1994): 23. 
 8 
Demarcating strategy from tactics grew out of the need to differentiate between 
planning/executing an engagement, and coordinating multiple engagements with each 
other in order to further the object of the war. Helmuth von Moltke conceptualized the 
operations level of war to capture the level in between strategy and tactics.12 The 
operational level of war developed as a practical concept to frame the decision-making 
and planning required by commanders engaged in multiple battles, but not of the war as a 
whole or of a specific battle.   
Thus, three levels of thinking are widely accepted in reference to warfare: 
strategy, operations, and tactics. The levels are also commonly reflected in business 
strategy as enterprise or corporate level, business or business-unit level, and functional or 
market level respectively. Traditionally, there is a hierarchical arrangement of strategy 
above operations and operations above tactics, and they are relative to one another. 
However, this arrangement must be viewed in context; the viewer’s perspective changes 
as their hierarchical level within the organization changes.   
From upper management’s perspective, decisions that affect the entire 
organization are strategic and decisions made by lower management are operational or 
tactical. Those operational or tactical decisions are perceived as strategic from the lower 
management’s perspective if they affect their entire component of the organization. As 
organizational theorist Russell Ackoff explains: “‘Strategy’ and ‘tactics’ are relative 
concepts depending on the organizational level at which the defining is done.”13 
A simple and coherent model of strategy is expressed by Art Lykke of the U.S. 
Army War College as strategy = ends + ways + means.14 In this model, ends are 
objectives—what is to be accomplished; ways are the strategic concepts—how the 
objectives are to be accomplished; and means are the resources, both tangible (forces, 
                                                 
12 Martin Dunn, “Levels of War: Just a Set of Labels?,” Clausewitz.com, accessed August 24, 2014, 
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Dunn.htm. 
13 Russell L. Ackoff, Redesigning the Future: Systems Approach to Societal Problems, 1st ed. 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 523.  
14 Richard Yarger, Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy 
Model (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 48. 
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people, equipment, money, facilities) and intangible (will, courage, spirit, intellect) with 
which the objectives will be attained.15   
A plethora of definitions, concepts, and perspectives on the meaning of the word 
strategy have evolved over time. Ackoff writes: “Most authors who discuss strategy do 
not define it; most of the definitions are in disagreement, and most of the definers do not 
acknowledge the existence of such disagreement.”16 A sampling from some of the most 
prominent authors in the field includes Carl von Clausewitz, who defines strategy as: “the 
art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the objective of war.”17 Moltke 
defines it as “the practical adaption of the means placed at a general’s disposal to the 
attainment of the object in view.”18 Liddell Hart’s definition, also from a military 
perspective, is: “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of 
policy.”19 
Moving away from the military association, George Steiner points to a number of 
definitions, indicating there is very little agreement as to the meaning of strategy: 
 Strategy is that which top management does that is of great importance to 
the organization. 
 Strategy refers to basic directional decisions, that is, to purposes and 
missions. 
 Strategy consists of the important actions necessary to realize these 
directions. 
 Strategy answers the question: What should the organization be doing? 
 Strategy answers the question: What are the ends we seek and how should 
we achieve them?20 
In the business sector, Porter’s Five Forces tool is a popular example; Michael Porter 
defines competitive strategy as “a broad formula for how a business is going to compete, 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 49. 
16 Ackoff, Redesigning the Future, 521. 
17 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, indexed ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 241. 





what its goals should be, and what policies will be needed to carry out those goals.”21 
Ackoff delves deeper into an organization’s specific strategy, defining it as “those 
decisions that are made by its highest level of management and that affect the 
organization as a whole.”22  
Strategy can also be defined as it relates to patterns. Thompson and Strickland 
define strategy as “the pattern of organizational moves and managerial approaches used 
to achieve organizational objectives and to pursue the organization’s mission.”23 John 
Bryson states strategy is “a pattern of purposes, policies, programs, actions, decisions, or 
resource allocations that define what an organization is, what it does, and why it does 
it.”24 Henry Mintzberg lists five definitions, known as the Five Ps for Strategy, in which 
he indicates strategy is a:  
 Plan, a direction, a guide or course of action into the future, a path to get 
from here to there.   
 Pattern, consistency in behavior over time.  
 Position, the locating of particular products in particular markets.   
 Perspective, an organization’s fundamental way of doing things. 
 Ploy, a specific “maneuver” intended to outwit an opponent or 
competitor.25 
It is clear from these definitions that strategy is considered many things, 
depending on in the context in which it is described and the author’s perspective. 
However, common themes that emerge from the definitions include: a high-level thought 
process, pertinence to the entire organization, a form of action, and an end or goal to be 
attained or achieved. Two other (though less common) themes are strategy that emerges 
through pattern or process, and the involvement of leaders/top managers.   
                                                 
21 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New 
York: Free Press, 2004). 
22 Ackoff, Redesigning the Future, 523. 
23 Alonzo J. Strickland and Arthur A. Thompson, Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases, 7th ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 6. 
24 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to 
Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 4th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011). 
25 Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the 
Wilds of Strategic Management (New York: Free Press, 1998), 26. 
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Choosing not to have a deliberate strategy at all is a strategy itself—a choice to 
discover where the organization will find itself.26 Though having no strategy may be the 
goal, strategy often emerges from the operations of an organization. The strategy is not 
explicit or formal, but develops as a result of the processes and decisions that are made. 
This is also known as strategic effect.27   
B. STRATEGY FORMULATION 
The literature categorizes strategy formulation in many ways, along one or more 
continua of process, perspective, participation, time, input, or outcome. Mintzberg, 
Ahlstrand, and Lampel organize strategy formulation into ten schools of thought in three 
fundamental types:  
 Prescriptive: how strategies are formulated, 
 Descriptive: how strategies actually form, and 
 Configuration: combines the others into distinct stages or episodes.28  
In The Right to Win, Cesare Mainardi and Art Kleiner place strategy authors on 
two continua: who makes strategy decisions (from many to few), and in what time 
orientation (from future to present).29 The four quadrants created each represent a basic 
school of thought on the nature of the right to win: 
 Position: select favorable markets as defined by external forces 
 Concentration: make the most of current core strengths and businesses 
 Execution: gain advantage through operational excellence 
 Adaption: develop overall direction through experimentation and rapid 
change30 
 
                                                 
26 Nickols, “Strategy: Definitions and Meaning,” 5.  
27 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 16.  
28 Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, Strategy Safari, 17. 




Richard Whittington also placed strategy theories along two continua (sometimes 
referred to as the “two-by-two” model): outcome (from profit maximizing to pluralistic—
such as social missions); and process (from deliberate to emergent).31 Again, the four 
quadrants created each represent a different approach to strategy formulation:  
 Classical: a top-down, rational, logical approach places profitability as the 
goal 
 Processual: strategies emerge through small, incremental steps  
 Evolutionary: markets driver profitability, stronger performers survive 
weaker ones become extinct 
 Systemic: social relations such as family, state, or religion can 
dramatically impact strategy without regard to their effect on 
profitability32 
The strategy formulation literature is grouped into the following five categories 
for this review, by the type and amount of input that produced the strategy:  
 Pre-active: formal, top-down, rational, deliberate approach with 
profitability as the goal and focus on analysis: the “strengths and 
weaknesses of the organization in light of the opportunities and threats in 
its environment (SWOT).”33 Strategic planning consultants (usually 
external) create explicit, formal, structured plans.  
 
 Active: develops and forms either through the perspective of its creator or 
through the process by which it emerged.   
 Perspective: reflective of the person(s) creating it, the culture of 
the organization, and the influences and biases of each.  
 Emergent: small incremental steps constantly seeking to align 
people and processes for execution and operational excellence. 
  
                                                 
31 Christopher Baird, “Why Is There so Much Disagreement about What Strategy Is?,” Academia.edu, 
November 2012, 4, https://www.academia.edu/2980379/
Why_is_there_so_much_disagreement_about_what_strategy_is. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, Strategy Safari, 24. 
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 Reactive: reaction to the external environment, passively through 
evolution or actively through adaption.   
 Passive: market drives strategy to best position the organization 
within it and organizations either evolve or become extinct.34  
 Active: organizations must act quickly and creatively in response 
to events, through experimentation and rapid change, as business 
faces more volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity 
(VUCA).35  
 Proactive: flexible strategies to manage uncertainty and promote 
collaboration, balancing the conflict between the commitment to a strategy 
that is necessary for positive results and the risk of uncertainty over which 
strategy to commit to. 
 Hyperactive: manage a process of periodic disruptive transformation, a 
quantum leap to another configuration due to an event that fundamentally 
changes the market or environment in which the organization operates.36 
Table 1 shows the main concepts of each category, which authors are its 
proponents, and how it relates to the aforementioned formulation categories.  
 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 387. 
35 Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy (Carlisle, 
PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 18, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0602yarger.pdf. 
36 Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, Strategy Safari, 51. 
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Table 1.   Strategy Formulation Matrix 














Prescriptive Position Classical 
Active 
Perspective 
 Of creator 









Prescriptive Concentration Systemic 
Emergent 
 Incremental steps 
 Align people and 
processes  











Descriptive Execution Classical 
Re-active 
Passively 
 Market drives 
strategy 







Descriptive Position Evolutionary 
Actively 
 Experimentation 





























Christensen Configuration Adaption Processual 
 
 15 
It is necessary for leaders, strategists, and planners to understand the different 
perspectives on how strategies form to know which approach or combination of 
approaches they are deciding on, allowing them to prepare for any of the issues that type 
of strategy may bring. It also allows them to understand which strategies may be 
emerging, which further allows them to keep a watchful eye for issues associated with 
that form of strategy development.  
C. STRATEGIC PLANNING 
The word strategic is used interchangeably throughout the literature to mean 
“related to strategy,” in its various forms, or “of great importance,” usually in a broad and 
long-term sense. Merriam-Webster does the same: “of, relating to, or marked by 
strategy…of great importance within an integrated whole or to a planned effect.”37 The 
Oxford Dictionary defines strategic as “relating to the identification of long-term or 
overall aims and interests and the means of achieving them.”38 The literature is far more 
ambiguous, however, when combining the term “strategic” with the term “planning.”  
Bryson posits that strategic planning “is not a single thing, but instead an 
approach (or set of approaches) to responding to circumstances that key actors judge 
require a considered, collective, and often novel response.”39 To understand how the term 
strategic planning is being used, it must be placed within the context of the strategy 
enterprise in an organization, into or around other perspectives such as the strategic 
planning process, strategic thinking, strategy formulation, strategic vision, strategic 
management, and the strategic plan itself. 
 
                                                 
37 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “Strategic,” accessed September 4, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/strategic. 
38 Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “Strategic,” accessed September 4, 2016, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/strategic. 
39 B. Guy Peters, The SAGE Handbook of Public Administration (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012), 
50. 
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1. Strategic Planning Process 
There is little consensus and competing perspectives among strategy authors 
about the strategic planning process, what it includes, and who performs what role and 
when. An astounding number of strategic planning processes are described in the 
literature, with multiple steps in various sequences. Bryson presents perhaps the most 
popular of these processes as his “strategy change cycle,” which he equates to a strategic 
planning process with the following steps: 
1. Initiate and agree on a strategic planning process 
2. Identify organizational mandates 
3. Clarify organizational missions and values 
4. Assess the external and internal environments 
5. Identify the strategic issues facing the organization 
6. Formulate strategies to manage the issues 
7. Review and adopt the strategies or strategic plan 
8. Establish an effective organizational vision 
9. Develop an effective implementation process 
10. Reassess strategies and the strategic planning process40 
Bryson strongly cautions that “strategic thinking, acting, and learning are much 
more important than any particular approach to strategic planning.”41 Lauren Edwards 
extrapolates the most often cited components in public sector strategic planning literature, 
(all of which align somewhat with Bryson’s process): 
1. Plan for strategic planning 
2. State organizational mission/vision/values 
3. Assess external and internal environments (SWOT) 
4. [Assess stakeholders] 
5. Identify and analyze issues facing the organization 
6. State goals of how the organization will face issues 
7. Create strategies for reaching goals 
                                                 
40 Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 30. 
41 Ibid., 31. 
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8. Assess feasibility of strategies 
9. Create and implement action plans 
10. Evaluate, monitor, and update process42 
Edwards also creates a “framework of comprehensive strategic planning processes” from 
studies of organizations that successfully implemented strategic planning; this framework 
includes the following characteristics:  
 General management capacity 
 Good leadership 
 Broad participation 
 Inclusion of essential elements 
 Broad dissemination 
 Integration with performance management practices, budgeting, and 
human resource management43 
These lists of components, characteristics, and comprehensive processes for 
strategic planning serve as the basis for the preferred strategic planning process, which 
will be utilized in a comparative framework in Chapter IV. Organizations must 
understand that these steps represent a generic model of a strategic planning process, and 
they must decide which steps to take and which not to take, what other steps to take, and 
in what order to take them, all based on the characteristics of the organization and the 
environment in which they operate. 
2. Strategic Thinking  
The central dichotomy in the literature on strategic thinking is whether it is a 
creative or analytical process. The analytical perspective is that strategic thinking 
encompasses strategy formulation, strategic planning, and strategy development using 
analytical tools that create strategies. Heracleous writes: “Porter and others, therefore, use 
the term ‘strategic thinking’ not as a synthetic and divergent thought process, but as a 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 18. 
43 Ibid., 20. 
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convergent and analytical one; in the same way as other authors would use the term 
strategic planning.”44   
The creative perspective is that strategic thinking involves synthesis, intuition, 
and creativity—the act of thinking strategically. Mintzberg describes the outcome of 
strategic thinking as “an integrated perspective of the enterprise, a not-too-precisely 
articulated vision of direction,” and not merely “alternative nomenclature for everything 
falling under the umbrella of strategic management.”45 Liedtka, however, explains that 
both the creative and analytical aspects “are clearly needed in any thoughtful strategy-
making process.”46 Heracleous bridges the divide by explaining Porter’s focus on 
positioning the organization and Mintzberg’s focus on how strategies are determined, 
which “leads these authors to advocate corresponding thinking modes, which in the final 
analysis are both necessary and complementary.”47   
3. Strategic Vision 
In the context of strategic planning, vision is commonly defined as where you 
want the organization to be, or the future state of the organization.48 A significant amount 
of literature addresses formulating and disseminating a vision, primarily through a well-
crafted vision statement. Visions should be realistic and credible, describing an attractive 
future for an organization that provides purpose and direction, and should inspire and 
motivate the members of the organization to attain that vision.49 Not all authors agree on 
specifying a vision; as Satell writes:  
                                                 
44 Loizos Heracleous, “Strategic Thinking or Strategic Planning?,” Long Range Planning 31, no. 3 
(June 1998): 482, doi:10.1016/S0024-6301(98)80015-0. 
45 Henry Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” Harvard Business Review, January–
February (1994), https://hbr.org/1994/01/the-fall-and-rise-of-strategic-planning; Lawrence, Strategic 
Thinking: A Discussion Paper,” 3. 
46 Jeanne M. Liedtka, “Strategic Thinking: Can it Be Taught?,” Long Range Planning 31, no. 1 
(February 1998): 121, doi:10.1016/S0024-6301(97)00098-8. 
47 Heracleous, “Strategic Thinking or Strategic Planning?,” 485. 
48 Industrial College of the Armed Forces and National Defense University Press, Strategic 
Leadership and Decision Making: Preparing Senior Executives for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1997), chap. 18, pg. 9, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS1059. 
49 Ibid., chap. 18, pg. 1. 
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Sometimes a clear vision can blind management to market realities…and 
that’s the problem with a vision; it’s almost impossible to distinguish it 
from a delusion. Furthermore, it is prone to survival bias-we remember the 
few that succeed, but the legions of failures are mostly lost to history.50 
Prominent authors disagree on whether strategic planning creates the vision or is 
the process of creating a strategy to attain the vision. Mintzberg is a strong proponent of 
the latter: “Strategic planning, as it has been practiced, has really been strategic 
programming, the articulation and elaboration of strategies, or visions, that already 
exist…. Far from providing strategies, planning could not proceed without their prior 
existence.”51 
4. Strategic Management 
The literature presents multiple definitions and perspectives on strategic 
management as well. These range from strategic management as the process of managing 
the outputs of the strategic planning process (implementation, review, assessment, 
updates, and associated organizational training and development), to managing the 
outputs and inputs of the process (analysis, synthesis, and strategy formulation). Poister 
and Streib go even further, writing that strategic management “integrates all other 
management processes to provide a systematic, coherent, and effective approach to 
establishing, attaining, monitoring, and updating an agency’s strategic objectives.”52 
5. Strategic Planning Concerns 
A well-formulated strategy elucidated in a strategic plan can focus the 
organization toward a common goal, aligning efforts and optimizing processes. However, 
strategic planning can be overly focused on the present and the past, and on analysis and 
extrapolation, locking the organization into cycles of plan, implement, review, and update 
that may restrict it from looking ahead and preparing for unforeseen opportunities or 
                                                 
50 Greg Satell, “The Evolution of Strategy,” Forbes, September 14, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/
sites/gregsatell/2013/09/14/the-evolution-of-strategy/. 
51 Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” 107, 111. 
52 Theodore H. Poister and Gregory D. Streib, “Strategic Management in the Public Sector: Concepts, 
Models, and Processes,” Public Productivity & Management Review 22, no. 3 (1999): 308, doi:10.2307/
3380706. 
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threats. Successful strategies tend to move into the next planning cycle, leading the 
organization to believe simply following the plan will guarantee success. Lawrence 
indicates that strategic planning “tends to create the illusion of certainty in a world where 
certainty is anything but guaranteed.”53 Satell concurs, writing: “As the speed of business 
continues to accelerate and technology cycles outpace corporate planning cycles, the false 
certainty that planning engenders is becoming an impediment to, rather than a tool for, 
attaining objectives.”54 
Daniel Ebner lists several negative arguments regarding strategic planning, 
including rigidity that restricts strategic thinking, adaptability, and flexibility.55 Formal 
strategic planning is susceptible to Mintzberg’s three “fallacious assumptions: that 
prediction is possible; that strategists can be detached from their strategies; and above all, 
that the strategy making process can be formalized.”56 Understanding which strategic 
planning method to use requires a deep understanding of the organization and the 
environment in which it operates. Strategies that work well in certain conditions can be 
extremely harmful in others.57 
6. Mitigating Strategic Planning Concerns 
To encourage strategic thinking, organizations can utilize structured planning 
tools such as scenario planning (originated and championed at Royal Dutch/Shell). 
Multiple potential futures are explored, with players working through what would need to 
happen to survive or excel in those environments. As Heracleous indicates, this forces 
managers to question their guiding assumptions “and sensitize their thinking to potential 
competitive arenas substantially different from current ones.”58 
                                                 
53 Lawrence, Strategic Thinking: A Discussion Paper, 10. 
54 Satell, “Evolution of Strategy,” 2. 
55 Daniel Ebner, Formal and Informal Strategic Planning: The Interdependency between 
Organization, Performance and Strategic Planning (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 
56. 
56 Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” 110. 
57 Henry Mintzberg, “Patterns in Strategy Formation,” Management Science 24, no. 9 (May 1978): 
948. 
58 Heracleous, “Strategic Thinking or Strategic Planning?,” 481.  
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To ensure an organization is not blindly committing to a successful strategy 
without looking ahead (or around) for opportunities or threats, Raynor believes upper 
management should build strategic options for the organization, rather than make 
strategic choices; lower management should have the flexibility to decide which option to 
commit to. He calls this principle Requisite Uncertainty because each level of the 
hierarchy is defined by its relationship to managing strategic uncertainty.”59 Innes and 
Booher posit the theory of collaborative rationality to manage uncertainty, replacing 
linear process and formal expertise with a “non-linear, socially constructed processes 
engaging both experts and stakeholders.”60 
To protect an organization from succumbing to unexpected disruptive innovation, 
Christensen recommends discovery-based planning, in which managers assume forecasts 
and the strategies chosen may be wrong. This “drives managers to develop plans for 
learning what needs to be known, a much more effective way to confront disruptive 
technologies successfully.”61 Organizations must be prepared for the transformative 
nature of disruptive innovation; as Christensen warns, “The very processes and values 
that constitute an organization’s capabilities in one context, define its disabilities in 
another context.”62 
Though the lack of flexibility remains a common concern about strategic 
planning, Boyd and Reuning-Elliott found “a positive relationship between the 
orientation toward change (as measured by the Miles and Snow continuum) and strategic 
planning.”63 Strategic planning can include a framework for adaption and flexibility to 
                                                 
59 Michael E. Raynor, The Strategy Paradox: Why Committing to Success Leads to Failure (and What 
to Do about it), 1st ed. (New York: Crown Business, 2007), 254.  
60 Judith Eleanor Innes and David E. Booher, Planning with Complexity (London: Routledge, 2010), 
5.  
61 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to 
Fail (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997), 325. 
62 Ibid., 331.  
63 Brian K. Boyd and Elke Reuning-Elliott, “A Measurement Model of Strategic Planning,” Strategic 
Management Journal 19, no. 2 (February 1998): 186. 
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help an organization work its way through a significant change in structure, orientation, 
or environment.64 
7. Strategic Planning in the Public Sector 
Strategic planning models proliferate in business but are difficult to adapt to the 
public sector.65 Stakeholders in private organizations are usually aligned with 
profitability, while “public sector organizations have multiple goals and multiple 
stakeholders that pull the organization in different directions.”66 William Eldridge 
identifies seven categories of cultural distinction between public and private 
organizations that require different approaches to strategic planning due to different 
expectations for their success: 
 Governments have less competition than businesses. 
 Customer influence is likely to be weaker in government. 
 Measuring governmental work performance is more difficult. 
 Rapid turnover of governmental leaders causes instabilities that inhibit the 
developing and sustaining of a long-term strategic direction for the 
organization. 
 Governments have more stakeholders and are subject to greater outside 
influence than are private companies.67 
Public organizations have more difficulty determining external metrics for 
success than the private sector, as they often do not have to compete for customers. 
Political and social needs, not customers or markets, typically determine funding in 
public organizations. The FDNY receives funding this way, but incorporating emergency 
medical services (EMS) and tightening of government budgets has forced it to account 
                                                 
64 Carola Wolf and Steven W. Floyd, “Strategic Planning Research Toward a Theory-Driven Agenda,” 
Journal of Management, March 26, 2013, 15, doi:10.1177/0149206313478185. 
65 Edwards, “Strategic Planning in Local Government,” 15. 
66 Lester Young, Thomas E. Reynolds, and Thomas Lee Harris II, “Organizational Strategic Planning 
and Execution: Should Governmental Organizations Rely on Strategic Planning for the Success of the 
Organization?” (joint applied project, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 87, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
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67 William H. Eldridge, “Why Angels Fear to Tread: A Practitioner’s Observations and Solutions on 
Introducing Strategic Management to a Government Culture,” in Jack Rabin and Gerald J. Miller (eds.), 
Handbook of Strategic Management, 2nd ed., 319–336 (Baca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2000). 
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for revenue generation more significantly than in the past. The private sector has always 
used profitability as its metric of success, and has numerous ways to determine it.  
A compelling perspective on public performance metrics is Mark Moore’s 
concept of public value, equating it to shareholder value in the private sector. While 
public sector managers are traditionally focused on implementation, Moore envisions a 
“strategic triangle for the public sector” that encourages them to “look for opportunities 
to use their organization to create public value”; the triangle 
 defines the organization’s mission in terms of important public values, 
 describes the sources of support and legitimacy that the organization can 
draw on to accomplish its mission, and 
 explains what activities the organization uses to achieve its mission.68 
Bryson expands: “creating public value means producing enterprises, policies, programs, 
projects, services, or infrastructures (physical, technological, social, etc.) that advances 
the public interest and the common good at a reasonable cost.”69 Public sector strategies 
can align more closely with private sector strategies and their outcomes by substituting 
public value for profit.   
A large number of studies focus on the impact of strategic planning on 
organizational performance, but few involve the public sector. As Lauren Edwards notes: 
“Many of these studies suggest that strategic planning has a positive impact on firm 
financial performance. However, to date, only a handful of studies have tested the impact 
of strategic planning on performance in the public sector.”70 Young, Reynolds, and 
Harris examined twenty-four federal agencies with improved performance after 
successfully adopting strategic planning. After studying six of these with different 
missions, the authors “found conclusive evidence that strategic planning did significantly 
                                                 
68 Steven Cohen, William Eimicke, and Tanya Heikkila, The Effective Public Manager: Achieving 
Success in a Changing Government, 4th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2008), 255. 
69 Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 8. 
70 Edwards, “Strategic Planning in Local Government,” 43. 
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improve the effectiveness of these six organizations and should be routinely applied as a 
fundamental doctrine of normal operations.”71 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
Literature on strategy and strategic planning suffer the same affliction: correlation 
does not equal causation and the extensive data supporting conclusions are replete with 
survivor bias. A number of authors and studies make compelling arguments that strategic 
planning both improves and hurts organizational performance. More research is needed to 
unravel the complexities of this argument, especially in the context of the public sector.   
The strategic planning community continues to progress through a cycle: embrace 
the latest fad, discover its problems, then move onto the next fad, which supposedly has 
addressed the old fad’s failures. New processes emerge that are often an amalgam of old 
ones, cherry-picking positive concepts and introducing new ones designed to eliminate 
what went wrong or was missing. After several decades of these cycles, the theories have 
evolved to the point where solutions have been posited for most of the identified issues 
surrounding strategic planning. Recurring themes in the literature that correlate to 
organizational success include 
 culture that encourages learning at every level of the organization; 
 room for innovation at any level of the organization;  
 iterative process of feedback in a constant cycle of improvement; 
 direct connection between the front line and strategic planners; 
 strategy formulators with a deep understanding of the organization’s 
history, capabilities, resources, environment, and culture; broad and 
diverse vertical and horizontal input from all internal domains; 
 divergent and emergent input from inside and outside the organization;  
 collaboration between disparate groups inside and outside the 
organization; and 
 performance measurement of outcomes in addition to outputs. 
                                                 
71 Young, Reynolds, and Harris, “Organizational Strategic Planning and Execution,” 83.  
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Ultimately, organizations like the FDNY must know the spectrum of strategy 
formulation processes and perspectives. They must match them to a deep understanding 
of their internal and external environments to determine which process or combination of 
processes to employ for that organization, in that environment, at that time.72 
  
                                                 
72 Wolf and Floyd, “Strategic Planning Research,” 18. 
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III. REVIEW OF THE FDNY STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS  
This chapter presents an in-depth review of the FDNY’s development and 
implementation of a strategic planning process after 9/11, and its continuous use since. 
The goal of this review is to assess existing post-9/11 processes and policies relative to 
strategic planning at the FDNY while considering the potential for modified or new 
processes. The review begins with McKinsey & Company’s 2002 analysis and final 
report, titled Increasing the FDNY’s Preparedness. It continues with the formulation of 
the FDNY’s first strategic plan in 2004 and a combined review of the subsequent four 
FDNY strategic plans, released in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2015. It also looks at several 
bureau or command plans and two department-wide but conceptually specific strategies. 
The review continues with the Boston Consulting Group’s 2012 analysis and final report, 
titled Project Axiom, and concludes with a list of the components of the FDNY strategic 
planning process, as discovered through the review.  
After the unimaginable tragedy of 9/11, the FDNY began a top-to-bottom 
assessment of the entire Department’s response and what it revealed about its ability to 
respond to all-hazard events. The City of New York and the FDNY commissioned world-
renowned consultants from McKinsey & Company to conduct a study of the 
Department’s response on 9/11 and make recommendations to improve preparedness in 
the future.73 One resulting recommendation was to enhance planning and management 
processes by creating “a formal Annual Plan, consisting of clear objectives, along with 
initiatives designed to meet those objectives.”74 The FDNY embraced and expanded on 
this recommendation, producing five strategic plans to date, in addition to several bureau 
plans and department-wide concept strategies.  
 
                                                 
73 Daniel Shacknai and Meta Ribowsky, “History of Strategic Planning at FDNY,” WNYF, 2011, 14. 
74 McKinsey & Company, Increasing the FDNY’s Preparedness, 77. 
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A. MCKINSEY & COMPANY 
McKinsey & Company spent five months with the FDNY conducting an 
exhaustive review of its response to the terrorist attack on 9/11. They focused on 
identifying policies and procedures, organizational constructs, and improvements in 
technology that would increase the Department’s preparedness. McKinsey & Company 
interviewed over a hundred FDNY personnel who responded to the attack and “examined 
transcripts of hundreds more the Department conducted internally.”75  
The McKinsey team was given unrestricted access to all FDNY records and 
personnel, including all senior staff members. They reviewed dispatch records and many 
hours of communication tapes. The team “also spoke with more than 100 experts in the 
United States and abroad, including those in other fire departments, emergency agencies, 
and the military, as well as researchers, and technology vendors.”76 They created multiple 
work groups that included about fifty fire and EMS members, who worked with them to 
develop recommendations during more than half of the study.77   
The final report was released in August 2002 and included an extensive analysis 
of the FDNY’s response on 9/11. The report presented fifteen short- and long-term 
recommendations grouped into four key areas: operations, planning and management, 
communications and technology, and family and member support services.78 The FDNY 
embraced the recommendations, some of which they implemented before the final 
McKinsey report was released. Just nineteen months later, when the FDNY released the 
first of its own strategic plans, all of the McKinsey recommendations in the areas of 
planning and management and family and member support services had been completed, 
and many of the Operations recommendations were in later stages of implementation (see 
Appendix C for more details).    
                                                 
75 Ibid., 3. 
76 Ibid., 4. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 23. 
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B. FROM MCKINSEY TO FDNY STRATEGIC PLANNING 
In response to the McKinsey recommendation to enhance its planning and 
management capabilities, the FDNY created a strategic planning process involving 
bureau heads, staff chiefs, and managers at the highest levels of the bureaus and units 
throughout the Department. They created a Planning Oversight Committee (POC), led by 
the fire commissioner and the chief of department that oversaw the work of a Planning 
Work Group (PWG) to collate the bureaus’ short- and long-term goals.79   
The chief of planning and strategy and the deputy commissioner for 
intergovernmental affairs and management initiatives co-chaired the PWG. It also 
included two fire deputy assistant chiefs (borough commanders), the EMS deputy 
assistant chief of planning and strategy, the associate commissioner for management 
initiatives, the director of management analysis and planning, and the director of strategic 
planning. The POC and the PWG prioritized the goals and synthesized them into 
improvements for everyday response as well as punctuated large-scale events. They 
developed an accountability plan by establishing reporting requirements to monitor 
milestones, evaluate performance, and ensure successful completion of the plan’s 
objectives.80    
The PWG also took on what turned out to be a much more difficult challenge: 
developing a mission statement that reflected the Department’s changing responsibilities; 
and identifying the FDNY’s core values that would respect the Department’s history 
while framing its future in a new and uncertain environment. After engaging in “spirited 
discussions over the course of many months,” the PWG agreed on six core values—
service, bravery, safety, honor, dedication, and preparedness—and a more comprehensive 
agency mission statement that better reflected the Department’s expanded responsibilities 
in a post-9/11 world:  
As first responders to fires, public safety and medical emergencies, 
disasters and terrorist acts, FDNY protects the lives and property of New 
York City residents and visitors. The Department advances public safety 
                                                 
79 Shacknai and Ribowsky, “History of Strategic Planning at FDNY,” 14. 
80 Ibid. 
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through its fire prevention, investigation, and education programs. The 
timely delivery of these services enables the FDNY to make significant 
contributions to the safety of New York City and homeland security 
efforts.81 
This effort culminated in the first FDNY Strategic Plan, released on March 29, 2004.   
C. FDNY STRATEGIC PLAN 2004−2005 
The POC identified six priority goals and an ambitious list of twenty primary and 
fifteen secondary objectives representing 100 initiatives.82 Three of the priority goals 
reflect the McKinsey report’s recommendations: improve emergency response 
operations, strengthen management and organizational development, and advance 
technology.83 
The remaining McKinsey report recommendation, enhance the system to provide 
support services to families and members—which was partially implemented with the 
establishment of the Family Assistance Unit (FAU) and the Family Information Call 
Center (FICC)—was listed as an objective under strengthen management and 
organizational development.84   
Three goals were added to the McKinsey recommendations: 
 Enhance health and safety of FDNY members. Already a core FDNY 
value, 9/11 exponentially increased the number of members with physical 
and mental health problems. It also highlighted the need for greatly 
expanded chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive 
protection for its members.85  
 Increase diversity. A growing focus for the Department elevated by 
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaints 
filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) in 2004. 
 Improve fire prevention and fire safety education. The events of 9/11 
highlighted the need for new safety requirements and evacuation plan 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 “FDNY Strategic Plan: 2004–2005,” FDNY, accessed September 21, 2016, ii, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/fdny/pdf/pr/2004/strategic_plan/strategic_plan_whole.pdf/. 
84 Ibid., iv. 
85 Ibid., 17. 
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procedures for commercial high-rise buildings.86 Educating at-risk 
communities was already a vital component of the FDNY, and the 
Department wanted to increase focus in this area.87 
Though two of the three goals were prioritized as a result of 9/11, all reflect a broader and 
more pro-active perspective than the McKinsey report, focusing on prevention as 
opposed to response. Under each objective were four sections: 
 Background: the context and critical need the objective seeks to address   
 Accomplishments: the work already completed to meet each objective   
 Next Steps and Timeframe: the specific work required during the next two 
years to complete the objective  
 Lead Bureau: the Department bureau responsible for each objective88   
In June 2005 the FDNY released the “Strategic Plan 2004−2005 First Year 
Scorecard,” which extolled their accomplishments and included a report-card style 
checklist for all primary and secondary objectives with a summary of their completion 
percentage (see Table 2).89  
Table 2.   Strategic Plan 2004–2005 First Year Scorecard90 
% Objective Completion Primary Objectives Secondary Objectives 
Completed 43% 22% 
50-99% completed 29% 47% 





                                                 
86 Ibid., 29. 
87 Ibid., 30. 
88 Ibid., 6. 




The Final Scorecard for the 2004−2005 strategic plan was published as Appendix B of 
the 2007–2008 strategic plan (see Table 3).91 
Table 3.   Strategic Plan 2004–2005 Final Scorecard92 
% Objective Completion Primary Objectives Secondary Objectives 
Completed 93% 78% 
Nearing completion 7% 22% 
 
This was an unusually transparent approach for a public service agency, reflecting the 
FDNY’s commitment to strategic planning and institutional change.  
D. FDNY STRATEGIC PLANS TWO THROUGH FIVE 
The FDNY has produced four additional strategic plans to date since their first. 
All FDNY strategic plans essentially retained the main goals established in the first one 
with the exception of advance technology, which was incorporated into the technology 
components of each of the five remaining main goals. The FDNY revised the five 
principal goals for the 2015−2017 plan, reflecting the mayoral and agency administration 
change: 
 Safety: The Public, Firefighters and EMTs and Paramedics 
 Integrating Fire and EMS to Enhance the FDNY’s Ability to Deliver 
Emergency Medical Service 
 Diversity and Inclusion 
 Improving Service Delivery 
 Community Engagement93 
The second goal, Integrating Fire and Emergency Medical Service—which was 
included in several previous plans—now became a distinct goal, replacing strengthen 
                                                 
91 “FDNY Strategic Plan: 2007–2008,” FDNY, accessed September 21, 2016, 55, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/fdny/pdf/strat_plan/2007/strategic_plan_whole.pdf. 
92 Ibid. 
93 “FDNY Strategic Plan: 2015–2017,” FDNY, accessed September 21, 2016, 1, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/fdny/pdf/ofc/FDNY_strategic_plan_2015_2017.pdf. 
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management and organizational development.94 The other four goals roughly reflect 
those in previous plans. The 2015−2017 strategic plan is little changed from the other 
FDNY strategic plans, save a highlighted focus on integration, and inclusion. 
The number of primary objectives listed in the FDNY strategic plans ranged from 
fourteen to twenty four, and secondary objectives did not appear after the first plan. The 
first two plans included specific timeframes for attaining many of the tasks associated 
with the objectives, while successive ones did not. The 2015−2017 plan separated the 
objectives into short-term, intermediate, and long-term, adding a temporal context but not 
specifically in terms of attainment expectation.   
The first two FDNY strategic plans included an executive summary and summary 
charts of goals and objectives, and expressed objectives in the Background, 
Accomplishments, Next Steps and Timeframes, and Lead Bureau format. By the 
2009−2011 plan, the FDNY eliminated the executive summary and summary charts of 
goals and objectives; the “Background, Accomplishments, Next Steps and Timeframes, 
and Lead Bureau” framework; and the scorecard (though score-carding continued 
internally).   
Participation in the POC, later renamed Accountability Group (AG), and the 
PWG had several iterations over the course of the plans. The POC/AG expanded from 
two to eight members in the 2009−2010 and 2011−2013 plans, representing much 
broader inclusion of hierarchical levels. The PWG contracted from ten to five members 
for these plans, partly a result of previous PWG participants’ promotion to positions now 
included in the AG. However, combined with the expanded AG, this still represented 
much broader inclusion in the decision-making process.95 See Appendix B for further 
details. 
The PWG established “reporting requirements to monitor milestones, evaluate 
performance, and ensure successful completion of the plan’s objectives.”96 The process 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95 Meta Ribowsky (FDNY Strategic Planning Unit director), in discussion with author, 2016. 
96 Shacknai and Ribowsky, “History of Strategic Planning at FDNY,” 14. 
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included quarterly reports submitted by each bureau head and/or project leader or 
manager for inclusion in a priority projects report managed by the strategic planning 
director. Additionally, bureau heads were tasked with presenting initiatives of high 
importance to the AG at quarterly Commissioner’s Priority Projects Meetings.97 
E. FDNY BUREAU AND COMMAND STRATEGIC PLANS 
Other than one initiative in the 2011−2013 plan, “develop a five-year strategic 
plan for the Bureau of Communications” (which has not been completed to date), the 
FDNY does not require bureau- or command-specific strategic plans.98 However, several 
strategies and strategic plans emerged as a result of the influence of the strategic planning 
process (and the influence of some of the process participants): The Manhattan and 
Bronx Borough Commands produced strategic plans; the Special Operations Command 
(SOC) produced the Marine Operations Strategy and Rescue Operations Strategic Plan; 
the Safety and Inspection Services Command produced several risk management plans; 
and other bureaus started strategic plans but either never completed them, or completed 
them but without subsequent adoption by the Department. 
The Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP) produced two 
Department-wide strategies, the Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy and the 
FDNY Counterterrorism and Risk Management Strategy. These detail how the 
Department meets its evolving responsibilities in the homeland security network. CTDP 
indicates: “The Strategy’s end product is not simply an articulation of where the 
Department wants to be, but rather a road map describing how to get there.”99 These two 
strategies presented a broad but coordinated effort to place the FDNY as the emergency 
response agency at the forefront of each of these categories locally, nationally, and 
internationally.  
 
                                                 
97 Meta Ribowsky (FDNY Strategic Planning Unit director), in discussion with author, 2016. 
98 “FDNY Strategic Plan: 2011–2013,” FDNY, accessed September 21, 2106, 5, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/fdny/pdf/publications/FDNY_strategic_plan_2011_2013.pdf. 
99 CTDP, Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy, 7. 
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F. BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP (BCG) PROJECT AXIOM  
During the implementation of the 2011−2013 plan, several FDNY leaders 
concluded that the strategic planning process—begun as a result of the McKinsey 
report—had run its course. Almost 80% of the objectives delineated in the McKinsey 
report and the first three FDNY strategic plans had been attained (see Appendix C for 
more information). The five goals common to all of the strategic plans would always be 
part of the FDNY. They felt it was time to move the planning horizon further out, to look 
more strategically at what the Department needed to do to prepare for the future. 
Toward that end, the FDNY turned to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), a 
world-renowned consulting firm (BCG, McKinsey & Company, and Bain & Company 
are collectively known as the “Big Three”).100 Using existing relationships and 
leveraging their history and reputation, the FDNY was able to commission BCG to 
prepare an analysis and develop a long-term strategy on a pro-bono basis. This report, 
titled Project Axiom, was a significant departure from the FDNY strategic plans and the 
McKinsey report; it focused on a much longer time horizon (2030) and took a business/
market approach to analyze the potential future needs of New York City and what role 
the FDNY could play in meeting those needs.   
For three months in 2012, a team of seven BCG consultants worked with the 
FDNY to develop a 10+-year strategy. The company interviewed over fifty FDNY 
personnel (fire, EMS, and civilians) and conducted market research in order to: 
 Understand the “market” for life safety needs in NYC, how those needs 
were changing, and how the Department should adapt (if at all) to those 
changes. 
 Understand the historic and future trends of the life-safety needs of NYC 
to predict if and how the FDNY might need to change to meet new 
demands. 
 Brainstorm together the vision for the FDNY, guiding principles for any 
change, and the actions the FDNY can take to achieve the vision.101 
                                                 
100 “To the Brainy, the Spoils; Management Consulting,” Economist, May 11, 2013, 67–68. 
101 Boston Consulting Group, Project Axiom (Boston: BCG, 2012), FDNY Table of Contents and 
Intro.  
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The FDNY team included the fire commissioner, the first deputy commissioner, 
the chief medical officer, the chief of department, the chief of operations, the chief of 
EMS, and the chief of counterterrorism and emergency preparedness. Project Axiom 
determined that 3% of current FDNY incidents (2011) were related to fire, 15% to other 
life safety, and 82% to medical reasons. It also noted current staffing (2011) was 10,800 
uniformed fire personnel and 3,200 EMS personnel.102 Based on their analysis of ten-
year data trending, they projected in 2030 only 2% of FDNY incidents would be related 
to fire, 11% to other life safety, and 87% to medical reasons.103 
The BCG team determined and analyzed the drivers of fire, medical, and other 
life-safety incident rates and provided empirical data to support the rationales for each, as 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Incident Rate Drivers 
Fire Medical Other Life Safety 
 Population growth 
 Property crime 
 Vacancy rates 
 Smoking rates 
 Population growth 
 General health 
 Access to care 
 Environment 
 Population growth 
 Aging infrastructure 
 Historical trends in alarms and 
inspections104 
 
They also acknowledged potential disruptions (such as healthcare policy reform, 
worsening economic conditions, and worsening climate change), and calculated both 
low- and high-demand forecasts on either side of their baseline projection.105 BCG 
addressed surge capacity to large-scale disasters with a resource utilization analysis of 
response in four groupings of escalating potential disaster events.   
                                                 
102 Ibid., 10, SC1. 
103 Ibid., 11, SC1 Appendix. 
104 Ibid., 14, SC1 Appendix. 
105 Ibid., 12, SC1 Appendix. 
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Project Axiom concluded that FDNY would have to shrink its workforce 
significantly or adapt the force to meet new needs.106 In presenting this conclusion, BCG 
was mindful to consistently frame its analysis and recommendations within the context of 
the FDNY’s day-to-day mission resources while maintaining the ability to surge to large-
scale incidents.107 This was an important distinction, as the FDNY is a proud 150-year-
old institution steeped in tradition, and is historically extremely resistant to change.  
BCG grouped the recommendations into three categories: training/staffing model, 
deployment model, and service model.108 It provided benchmarks from other cities using 
those models, and an economic analysis of the current and projected demand 
environment for each.109 These initiatives did not commit to specific ends, but would put 
the Department on a path toward achieving them with flexibility to adapt to changes in 
the environment along the way. 
To address the change environment necessary to implement these 
recommendations, an experienced BCG global topic specialist facilitated a creative 
exercise with the team using BCG’s “Thinking in New Boxes” approach to ideation and 
long-term scenario planning.110 The team explored alignment on the need for change, top 
ideas on what specifically needs to change, barriers to change, and potential workarounds 
for the barriers.111 BCG distilled these ideas into eleven initiatives grouped into three 
categories: operational game changers, communications and community, and policy 
reform.112 
The Project Axiom report included “prep packs” for each initiative that detailed 
current thinking and were designed to restart the conversation (regardless of when), 
outline immediate next steps (six months to five+ years), and identify potential risks and 
                                                 
106 Ibid., 9, SC2 Workshop. 
107 Ibid., 21, SC2. 
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ways to mitigate them in order to finalize each initiative.113 This provided the FDNY 
with a cohesive plan that had actionable components, which could be initiated at any 
time, catalyzed by the work BCG provided in the form of the prep packs. BCG focused 
on the FDNY shaping its future, instead of having it defined for it by the changing 
environment.   
G. FDNY STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS (FD-SPP) ELEMENTS 
Based on the review detailed in this chapter, the following FDNY strategic 
planning process (FD-SPP) is delineated, as it is not documented formally in a policy or 
procedure. 
Components of the FD-SPP 
 Create a Planning Oversight Committee (POC) 
 Designate a Planning Work Group (PWG) 
 Develop/revise mission statement 
 Identify core values 
 Survey bureaus to identify short- and long-term goals and objectives 
 Prioritize initiatives to improve both daily and catastrophic response 
 Identify goals from prioritized initiatives for the next two years and 
beyond 
 Develop a list of critical initiatives necessary to achieve each goal 
 Elucidate the prioritized goals and initiatives necessary to achieve them in 
the form of a strategic plan 
 Develop reporting requirements to monitor milestones 
 Monitor progress of critical objectives against milestones 
 Conduct a detailed assessment of long- and short-term goals and 
objectives every two years 
 Publish in a new strategic plan 
  
                                                 
113 Ibid., 2, Initiative Prep Packs. 
 39 
H. BCG PROJECT AXIOM PLANNING PROCESS (BCG-PP) ELEMENTS 
Based on the review of the Project Axiom report, the following BCG Project 
Axiom planning process (BCG-PP) is delineated: 
Components of the BCG-PP 
 Create a steering committee and working team 
 Formulate a project timeline 
 Conduct internal and external analysis 
 Utilize FDNY mission statement 
 Utilize FDNY core values 
 Develop strategic options 
 Conduct demand landscape analysis 
 Surge needs 
 Life safety changes 
 Economics 
 Benchmarks of other models 
 Conduct “Thinking in New Boxes” creative workshops 
 Check alignment of ideas 
 Barriers to change 
 Align on vision and principles for change 
 Conduct internal and external stakeholder analysis 
 Create action plan (1−18 months; 18 months−5 years; 5 years+) 
 Prepare “initiative action (prep) packs”  
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I. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an in-depth review of the formulation and application of a 
strategic planning process at the FDNY. The process grew out of the McKinsey report 
prepared for the FDNY just after 9/11 and was used to create five strategic plans to date. 
The chapter includes a review of BCG’s Project Axiom, another report prepared for the 
FDNY by an outside consulting organization. Additionally, this chapter reviewed the 
second-order impact of the FDNY strategic planning process, notably several bureau or 
command strategic plans. It concludes with a description of the strategic planning process 
at the FDNY. Chapter IV compares that process to a baseline process culled from the 
literature, and to the BCG process used to create the Project Axiom report.   
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FDNY STRATEGIC PLANNING 
PROCESS  
Chapter III reviewed the FDNY strategic planning process since September 11, 
2001, and this chapter analyzes that process. The chapter begins by formulating a 
baseline strategic planning process and the weighting of its elements: components and 
characteristics. It then describes the comparative analysis and compares the FDNY 
process to the baseline process; the BCG Project Axiom process to the baseline process; 
and the FDNY process to the BCG Project Axiom process. The chapter concludes with 
results categorized for interpretation in Chapter V.   
Note: Due to the variability in the nomenclature of strategy, strategic planning, 
and related terms, Appendix D contains a list of frequently used terms and their 
definitions that will be used for the remainder of this thesis for clarity and brevity.   
A. PREFERRED STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS (PSPP) 
The literature review produced a list of desirable strategic planning process 
elements. Primary sources included scholarly writings, peer-reviewed studies, work by 
cited and prominent authors, and many articles/writings about strategic planning in public 
organizations. The following methodology determined the selection and weighting of 
elements for the analysis. 
1. Inclusion Methodology 
Sources for the analysis included two peer-reviewed studies, John Bryson’s 
Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, and five of the articles/
writings. The two studies used the impact of strategic planning on public sector 
organizational performance as their research topic, with outputs of preferred elements. 
Bryson’s book is the preeminent tome in this domain. Five of the articles/writings 
presented practical and usable preferred elements.   
A matrix compared the list of desired elements to the sources. Less than four data 
points of connection eliminated the element. The remaining 30 elements (23 components 
 42 
and 7 characteristics) are the preferred strategic planning process (PSPP). These are 
listed in Table 5 and are grouped into six functional categories: pre-formulation, 
formulation, planning, implementation, management, and characteristics.    
Table 5.   Elements of the PSPP 
Grouping Elements (Components/Characteristics) 
Pre-formulation 
 Create and Agree on Process 
 Create Vision Statement 
 Review/Revise/Create Mission Statement 
 Identify Organizational Values 
Formulation 
 Internal Analysis 
 External Analysis 
 Internal Stakeholder Analysis 
 External Stakeholder Analysis 
 Formulate Overall Strategy 
 Formulate Goals 
Planning 
 Generate Strategic Plan 
 Develop Objectives 
 Develop Action Plan 
 Develop Implementation Plan 
Implementation 
 Include Feedback Loop  
 Implement Action Plan 
 Implementation Plan 
Management 
 Targets (milestones) 
 Responsibility 
 Evaluate Goal/Objective Attainment 
 Evaluate Outcomes 
 Evaluate Benchmarks  
 Evaluate and Report Externally 
Characteristics 
 Leadership Support/Involvement 
 Future Orientation 
 Broad Perspective 
 Inclusion of Leaders 
 Inclusion of Managers 
 Inclusion of Lower-Level Staff 
 Inclusion of External Stakeholders 
 
2. Weighting Methodology 
Scoring of preferred elements used a 0−5 scale, study elements based on the 
analysis provided in the study, Bryson’s ten elements (steps) based on their importance in 
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the text, and the number of the articles/writings that applied a preferred element. An 
average of the scores, expressed as a percentage of the total, yielded the weighted score 
for each element, as shown in Tables 6 and 7.  
Table 6.   PSPP Weighting Matrix 
 
Component and characteristic scores were divided by three if not included in one of the studies, and by 
two if not included in both of the studies. See Appendix E for source information. 
 
Process Elements E Y B BR PS TCC N SM #Y Tot Wt 
Pre-formulation            
Create and Agree on Process 4 4 5   Y   1 14 0.035 
Create Vision Statement 2 4 5   Y Y  2 13 0.033 
Review/Revise/Create Mission Statement 4 5 5 Y Y Y Y  4 18 0.045 
Identify Organizational Values * * 3  Y Y Y  3 6 0.030 
Formulation            
Internal Analysis 4 5 5   Y   1 15 0.038 
External Analysis 3 5 5 Y Y Y   3 16 0.040 
Internal Stakeholder Analysis  * 3 4  Y    1 8 0.027 
External Stakeholder Analysis * 4 5  Y   Y 2 11 0.037 
Formulate Overall Strategy  * 4 5  Y Y Y  3 12 0.040 
Formulate Goals 5 5 4 Y  Y Y  3 17 0.043 
Planning            
Generate Strategic Plan 4 3 4  Y   Y 2 13 0.033 
Develop Objectives 5 3 5 Y  Y Y  3 16 0.040 
Develop Action Plan 3 3 5 Y Y Y   3 14 0.035 
Develop Implementation Plan * 3 4   Y  Y 2 9 0.030 
Implementation            
Include Feedback Loop  * 5 4   Y Y Y 3 12 0.040 
Implement Action Plan 3 * 5 Y  Y   2 10 0.033 
Implementation Plan * 3 4 Y  Y  Y 3 10 0.033 
Management            
Targets (milestones) * 4 3    Y Y 2 9 0.030 
Responsibility * 4 4   Y Y  2 10 0.033 
Evaluate Goal/Object Attain 3 * 3   Y Y Y 3 9 0.030 
Evaluate Outcomes 3 5 4   Y   1 13 0.033 
Evaluate Benchmarks  1 * 4   Y Y Y 3 8 0.027 
Evaluate and Report Externally 1 4 5     Y 1 11 0.028 
Characteristics            
Leadership Support/Involvement 1 5 5  Y Y   2 13 0.033 
Future Orientation * * 2  Y Y Y  3 5 0.025 
Broad Perspective * 3 3    Y Y 2 8 0.027 
Inclusion of Leaders 3 4 4  Y Y  Y 3 14 0.035 
Inclusion of Managers 4 4 3   Y  Y 2 13 0.033 
Inclusion of Lower-Level Staff 3 3 1   Y   1 8 0.020 
Inclusion of External Stakeholders 2 5 5  Y Y  Y 3 15 0.038 
 
 44 
Table 7.   PSPP Weighting Matrix Legend 
 
 
B. STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS COMPARISON  
The review in Chapter III summarized the FDNY strategic planning process (FD-
SPP) and the BCG Project Axiom planning process (BCG-PP). A matrix compared each 
to the PSPP, and to each other. Primary analysis compared the FD-SPP and PSPP. 
Secondary analysis compared the BCG-PP and PSPP, and the parts of the FD-SPP and 
BCG-PP processes that aligned with each other. The outcome of the comparative analysis 
yields results in two areas: how well the FD-SPP compared to the PSPP, and the contrast 
between the FD-SPP and BCG-PP when compared to the PSPP. Output of each is a list of 
weighted elements and their degree of variance, either from the preferred process or from 
each other.    
1. Primary Comparative Analysis 
The analysis used a qualitative approach, as the FDNY has no documented formal 
strategic planning process policy in place. Historical review; process output (the strategic 
plans themselves); internal, external, and published FDNY documents; media reports, 
external reviews; analysis; and commentary determined the score. The extent to which 
the FDNY applied an element determined its score on a 0−5 scale. A comparative 
analysis of these scores to the PSPP determined the alignment and relative impact. 
Outcome analysis includes a list of elements sorted by percentage of variance from the 
PSPP, the amount each would have to be improved to fully attain the PSPP, and the 
percentage of impact those changes would make on the overall process (see Tables 8 
and 9).  
Code Refers to Code Refers to Score Weighting 
E Edwards N Noble 0 Not mentioned 
Y Young et al SM Steurer & Martinuzzi 1 Not important 
B Bryson #Y # Yes to included in paper 2 Of little importance 
BR Boyd & Reuning-Elliott Tot Total of E+Y+B+#Y 3 Moderately important 
PS Poister & Streib Wt Weighted (Tot/#E, Y, B, #Y) 4 Important 
TCC TCC Group * Not included in calculation 5 Very important 
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Table 8.   Primary Comparative Analysis Matrix 
 
  
Primary Comparative Analysis 
Matrix 







Revise/Create Mission Statement 4.50% 6.75 5 6.75 0.00 4.50% 0% 0.00% 
Internal Analysis 3.75% 5.63 5 5.63 0.00 3.75% 0% 0.00% 
Inclusion of Leaders 3.50% 5.25 5 5.25 0.00 3.50% 0% 0.00% 
Create and Agree on Process 3.50% 5.25 5 5.25 0.00 3.50% 0% 0.00% 
Leadership Support/Involvement 3.25% 4.88 5 4.88 0.00 3.25% 0% 0.00% 
Identify Organizational Values 3.00% 4.50 5 4.50 0.00 3.00% 0% 0.00% 
Report Externally 2.75% 4.13 5 4.13 0.00 2.75% 0% 0.00% 
Internal Stakeholder Analysis  2.67% 4.00 5 4.00 0.00 2.67% 0% 0.00% 
Develop Implementation Plan 3.00% 4.50 4 3.60 0.90 2.40% 20% 0.60% 
Implementation Plan 3.33% 5.00 4 4.00 1.00 2.67% 20% 0.67% 
Implement Action Plan 3.33% 5.00 4 4.00 1.00 2.67% 20% 0.67% 
Accountability 3.33% 5.00 4 4.00 1.00 2.67% 20% 0.67% 
Develop Action Plan 3.50% 5.25 4 4.20 1.05 2.80% 20% 0.70% 
Broad Perspective 2.67% 4.00 3 2.40 1.60 1.60% 40% 1.07% 
Develop Strategic Plan 3.25% 4.88 3 2.93 1.95 1.95% 40% 1.30% 
Future Orientation 2.50% 3.75 2 1.50 2.25 1.00% 60% 1.50% 
Include Feedback Loop  4.00% 6.00 3 3.60 2.40 2.40% 40% 1.60% 
Develop Objectives 4.00% 6.00 3 3.60 2.40 2.40% 40% 1.60% 
Inclusion of Lower-Level Staff 2.00% 3.00 1 0.60 2.40 0.40% 80% 1.60% 
Formulate Goals 4.25% 6.38 3 3.83 2.55 2.55% 40% 1.70% 
Targets (Milestones) 3.00% 4.50 2 1.80 2.70 1.20% 60% 1.80% 
Evaluate Goal/Object Attain 3.00% 4.50 2 1.80 2.70 1.20% 60% 1.80% 
Inclusion of Managers 3.25% 4.88 2 1.95 2.93 1.30% 60% 1.95% 
Evaluate Benchmarks  2.67% 4.00 1 0.80 3.20 0.53% 80% 2.13% 
External Stakeholder Analysis 3.67% 5.50 2 2.20 3.30 1.47% 60% 2.20% 
Formulate Overall Strategy  4.00% 6.00 2 2.40 3.60 1.60% 60% 2.40% 
External Analysis 4.00% 6.00 1 1.20 4.80 0.80% 80% 3.20% 
Evaluate Outcomes 3.25% 4.88 0 0.00 4.88 0.00% 100% 3.25% 
Create Vision Statement 3.25% 4.88 0 0.00 4.88 0.00% 100% 3.25% 
Inclusion of External Perspective 3.75% 5.63 0 0.00 5.63 0.00% 100% 3.75% 
Total 100% 150 90 91 59 61% 55% 39% 




Table 9.   Primary Comparative Analysis Matrix Legend 
 
 
Primary comparative analysis found FD-SPP scored 61% of the PSPP. Average 
55% improvement in 22 of the 30 elements nets 39% overall impact to match the PSPP.   
Eight elements attained 100% of the weighted goal: 
 Revise/Create Mission Statement 
 Internal Analysis 
 Inclusion of Leaders 
 Create and Agree on Process 
 Leadership Support/Involvement 
 Identify Organizational Values 
 Report Externally 
 Internal Stakeholder Analysis 
Improve five elements 20% nets each a .5−1% total impact: 
 Develop Implementation Plan 
 Implementation Plan 
 Implement Action Plan 
 Accountability 
 Develop Action Plan 
Improve ten elements 40−80% nets each a 1−2% total impact: 
 Broad Perspective (40%) 
 Develop Strategic Plan (40%) 
 Future Orientation (60%) 
 Include Feedback Loop (40%) 
 Develop Objectives (40%) 
Code Refers to Code Refers to 
%Wt That element % of total  Var PSPP−FD-SPP Wt 
PSPP PSPP weighted score  % Tot Attain FD-SPP Wt / PSPP total 
FD FD-SPP score  Improve Needed % FD-SPP score increase needed to attain PSPP 
FD Wt FD-SPP weighted score  % Total Impact % total increases if PSPP attained 
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 Inclusion of Lower-Level Staff (80%) 
 Formulate Goals (40%) 
 Targets (Milestones) (60%) 
 Evaluate Goal/Objective Attainment (60%) 
 Inclusion of Managers (60%) 
Improve three elements 60−80% nets each a 2−3% total impact: 
 Evaluate Benchmarks (80%) 
 External Stakeholder Analysis (60%) 
 Formulate Overall Strategy (60%) 
Improve one element 80%, implement three, nets each 3−4% total impact: 
 External Analysis (80%) 
 Evaluate Outcomes (100%) 
 Create Vision Statement (100%) 
 Include External Perspective (100%) 
 
2. Secondary Comparative Analysis 
The extent to which the BCG applied an element determined its score on a 0−5 
scale. The Project Axiom report itself drove the scoring and delineated the process used 
to create it, along with limited historical knowledge of the process. Analysis excluded 
components that did not apply to the BCG-PP, as the report was not specifically a 
strategic plan, nor was it implemented. The comparative analysis of the weighted scores 
of the BCG-PP and PSPP determined their alignment. Adding the overlapping FDNY 
elements contrasted the approaches and comparative alignment with the PSPP. Analysis 
output is a list of elements sorted by the degree of variance from each other relative to the 
PSPP (see Tables 10 and 11). 
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Table 10.   Secondary Comparative Analysis Matrix 
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Table 11.   Secondary Comparative Analysis Matrix Legend 
Code Refers to Code Refers to 
FD FD-SPP score  % Tot Attain FD-SPP or BCG-PP Wt / PSPP total 
Var PSPP−FD Wt Imp Needed % improvement in score needed to attain PSPP for element 
BCG BCG-PP score % Total Impact % total increases if PSPP attained for element 
FD-SPP/BCG-PP Var FD-SPP improvement needed−BCG-PP improvement needed 
 
a. BCG-PP / PSPP Secondary Analysis Results  
BCG-PP elements attained a total score of 87% of the PSPP and an average 26% 
improvement in 9 of the 20 elements would net a 12% total impact to match the PSPP.   
Eleven elements attained 100% of the weighted goal: 
 Inclusion of Leaders 
 Create and Agree on Process 
 Identify Organizational Values 
 Revise/Create Mission Statement 
 Develop Objectives 
 Broad Perspective 
 Formulate Goals 
 Future Orientation 
 Formulate Overall Strategy 
 Create Vision Statement 
 Inclusion of External Perspective 
Improve three elements 20% nets each a .5−1% total impact: 
 Internal Stakeholder Analysis  
 Develop Implementation Plan  
 Develop Strategic Plan  
Improve four elements 20−40% nets each a 1−2% total impact: 
 Develop Action Plan (20%) 
 Inclusion of Managers (40%) 
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 External Stakeholder Analysis (20%) 
 External Analysis (20%) 
Improve two elements 40−80% nets each a 2−3% total impact: 
 Internal Analysis (40%) 
 Inclusion of Lower-Level Staff (80%) 
 
b. FD-SPP/PSPP Secondary Analysis Results  
FD-SPP elements attained a total score of 58% of the PSPP and an average 39% 
improvement in 14 of the 20 elements would net a 39% total impact to match the PSPP. 
Improvement potential of FD-SPP elements does not apply in the context of this 
comparison. BCG-PP elements outscored FD-SPP elements 87% to 58%, respectively.   
The FD-SPP outperformed the BCG-PP in two elements by percent indicated: 
 Internal Analysis (60%) 
 Internal stakeholder analysis (80%) 
The FD-SPP and BCG-PP performed the same in seven elements: 
 Inclusion of Leaders 
 Create and Agree on Process 
 Identify Organizational Values 
 Revise/Create Mission Statement 
 Develop Implementation Plan 
 Develop Action Plan 
 Inclusion of Lower-Level Staff 
The BCG-PP outperformed the FD-SPP in eleven elements by percent indicated: 
 Develop Strategic Plan (20%) 
 Inclusion of Managers (20%) 
 Develop Objectives (40%) 
 Broad Perspective (40%) 
 Formulate Goals (40%) 
 External Stakeholder Analysis (40%) 
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 Future Orientation (60%) 
 Formulate Overall Strategy (60%) 
 External Analysis (60%) 
 Create Vision Statement (100%) 
 Inclusion of External Perspective (100%) 
 
3. Limitations of the Comparative Analyses 
The body of literature used to select and weight preferred elements of the strategic 
planning process included theories, studies, and findings through early 2016. Neither the 
FD-SPP (created in 2002/2003), nor the BCG-PP (utilized in 2012) benefit from current 
perspectives on strategic planning processes that have risen or fallen in prominence in 
their comparative analyses. 
The comparative analysis used elements scored individually from multiple 
sources. The analysis does not account for the impact they may have on each other 
cumulatively or in combination. The researcher attempted to be as objective as possible 
in weighting and scoring the analysis, noting the significance of elements in the literature 
and extent of their application on the plans. However, each are subjective measurements 
(as is their use in the literature), and therefore subject to any personal or professional bias 
on the part of the researcher. 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Chapter IV analyzed the strategic planning process at the FDNY since September 
11, 2001, using a strategic planning process with weighted elements (components and 
characteristics) created from the literature as the preferred standard for comparison. 
Comparative analysis of the FDNY and BCG Project Axiom processes to the preferred 
standard yielded their respective alignment with it. Comparative analysis of those results 
contrasted the differences between each process, categorized by the impact they would 
have on the total planning process, including the percentage each would need to improve 
to achieve the preferred standard. Chapter V interprets the results, and combines them 
with subjective analysis to determine findings and recommendations. 
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSES INTERPRETATION 
The list of impacts and improvements from Chapter IV is re-grouped in this 
chapter by function within the process using the categories developed for the PSPP. The 
chapter goes on to subjectively identify precipitating factors and motivators that may 
have impacted the element’s performance in the comparative analysis, and the costs, 
benefits, obstructions, and impact of maintaining, eliminating, improving, or 
implementing the element at the FDNY.   
A. PRIMARY ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The impact on the overall process categorized the results of the primary analysis. 
As noted in the limitations of the comparative analysis, many of these elements work in 
conjunction with others. Any assessment of their overall impact and whether the FDNY 
should maintain, eliminate, improve, or implement them requires an understanding of 
how they interact and in what combinations. Therefore, the results are grouped into the 
six functional categories of the PSPP: pre-formulation, formulation, planning, 
implementation, management, and characteristics (see Tables 12 and 13).   
Grouping the comparative analysis results by function revealed the greatest 
potential for positive overall impact was in the characteristics grouping at 9.87%, 
followed by management at 9.65%, formulation at 9.50%, planning at 4.20%, pre-
formulation at 3.25%, and implementation at 2.93%. These results may be deceptive, 
however, as a number of the characteristics apply to several functional groupings, and the 
number of elements selected for the PSPP was not balanced across the functions. 
The greatest potential for positive overall impact in individual elements was the 
inclusion of external perspective (not applied by the FDNY) at 3.75%, create a vision 
statement (not applied by the FDNY) at 3.25%, evaluate outcomes (not applied by the 
FDNY) at 3.25% and external analysis (slightly applied by the FDNY) at 3.20%.  
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Table 12.   Primary Comparative Analysis Outcome 
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Table 13.   Primary Comparative Analysis Outcome Legend 
Code Refers to Code Refers to 
%Wt That element % of total  Var PSPP−FD-SPP Wt 
PSPP PSPP weighted score  % Tot Attain FD-SPP Wt / PSPP total 
FD FD-SPP score  Improve Needed % FD-SPP score increase needed to attain PSPP 
FD Wt FD-SPP weighted score  % Total Impact % total increases if PSPP attained 
 
1. Characteristics  
The FD-SPP attained a full score in 2 of the 7 characteristics of the PSPP, 
leadership support/involvement at 3.25%, and inclusion of leaders at 3.50%. The greatest 
potential for positive overall impact was inclusion of external perspective (not applied by 
the FDNY) at 3.75%, followed by inclusion of managers at 1.95%, inclusion of lower-
level staff at 1.60%, future orientation at 1.5%, and broad perspective at 1.07%. 
Current strategic planning experts consider broad and diverse inclusion in the 
strategic planning process invaluable. Exclusive participation detaches those creating the 
strategy from those who are responsible for implementing it, one of Mintzberg’s three 
fallacies of formal planning.116 According to Wolf and Floyd, “Participation is described 
in two dimensions: the extent of involvement (quantitative dimension) and the actual 
degree of influence on strategic decisions (qualitative dimension)...reduce bias and 
enhance goal convergence.”117 Inclusion gives employees a sense of ownership that 
manifests itself in commitment to the process.118 Participation in the strategy 
development process by middle managers has been shown to improve organizational 
performance, likely a result of their connections to both operations and top 
management.119   
Other than the McKinsey Report commissioned after September 11, 2001, and the 
BCG Project Axiom report commissioned in 2012, the FDNY has not included 
representatives from outside the Department in the strategic planning process. The 
                                                 
116 Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” 110. 
117 Wolf and Floyd, “Strategic Planning Research,” 17. 
118 Young, Reynolds, and Harris, “Organizational Strategic Planning and Execution,” 85. 
119 Wolf and Floyd, “Strategic Planning Research,” 16. 
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mayor’s office is involved inasmuch as it approves the strategic plan prior to publishing, 
occasionally requiring changes in the document, generally related to the funding of 
initiatives. Both McKinsey and BCG leveraged their significant and broad experience, 
expertise, and external perspective to objectively analyze the FDNY unencumbered by 
(but respectful of) the politics, history, and culture of the organization.  
Direct input in the FD-SPP was mostly confined to bureau heads and assistant and 
deputy fire commissioners. Both McKinsey and BCG ensured widespread input into their 
plans by incorporating more than fifty fire and EMS personnel into the process, including 
a number of managers—far more than were involved in the formation of any of the 
FDNY strategic plans.  
The FDNY engaged bureau heads to present current and future initiatives to the 
POC and PWG. Initiatives forwarded by bureau heads to the POC/AG and the PWG 
required collaboration and consensus among members to be included in the plan.120 The 
controlling variable was the horizontal and vertical inclusiveness of the PWG members. 
Participation in the planning groups shifted from inclusive to exclusive over their three 
iterations. By the 2015−2017 plan, the strategic planning group involved only the highest 
hierarchical levels of the organization, assistant commissioners and above (other than the 
director of strategic planning).121 See Appendix B for more information. 
The FDNY attempted to reach out to all levels of the organization for input in the 
2009−2010 and 2011−2013 plans through surveys, but they were forwarded thorough the 
chain of command and in most cases did not penetrate the organization’s lower levels. As 
such, the surveys garnered limited response, only thirty-eight for the 2009−2010 plan and 
sixty for the 2011−2013 plan. The FDNY did not distribute a survey for the 2015−2017 
plan.122 The lack of input received from the bureaus, commands, and all members of the 
Department did not capture a representative sample of the more than 15,000 FDNY 
                                                 




employees. Attempts to include ideas from a broad and diverse cross-section of members 
were insufficient and underutilized, and resulted in limited response.  
Though often referred to as the “FDNY’s first strategic plan,” the McKinsey 
report was more of a gap analysis of the FDNY’s response on 9/11. It was introspective, 
retrospective, and prospective, with a short planning horizon and recommendations 
intended for rapid implementation. Both the McKinsey report and all five FDNY plans 
used a short-term planning horizon (the 2015−2017 plan lists objectives as short-term, 
intermediate, and long-term, though it does not define the terms’ limits). Using a short 
planning horizon led to short-term goals and objectives in the FDNY strategic plans. 
Conversely, CTDP demonstrated long-term thinking in the Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy of 2007, indicating preparedness efforts “must include a long-term 
vision for the Department’s state of preparedness and an organizational methodology that 
can overcome and outlive transient obstacles.”123  
The FD-SPP applied to the whole Department and touched on a thorough cross-
section of the bureaus and commands that it encompasses. The plans did not present a 
coordinated effort toward a shared over-arching view as they were compartmentalized 
and defined incremental improvements in each area. This is likely the result of the lack of 
a vision statement and over-arching strategy. Again contrasting the FDNY strategic 
plans, the two strategies published by the CTDP describe a broad but coordinated effort 
toward a shared goal. 
2. Management 
The FD-SPP attained a full score in 1 of the 6 management components of the 
PSPP, report externally at 2.75%, and scored well in accountability at 2.67%, with little 
improvement needed. The greatest potential for positive overall impact was evaluate 
outcomes (not applied by the FDNY) at 3.25%, followed by evaluate benchmarks at 
2.13%, targets (milestones) at 1.80%, and evaluate goal/objective attainment at 1.80%.   
                                                 
123 CTDP, Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy, 11. 
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Strategic plans require an evaluation component to ensure they are netting desired 
results, are on track for implementation, and the goals are still desired in the dynamic and 
changing environment. According to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces:  
An organization must and can develop a strategic plan that includes 
specific and measurable goals…and cover all the areas where action is 
needed to move toward the vision…actions should clearly state who is 
responsible for their completion. Actions should have milestones tied to 
them so progress toward the goals can be measured.124 
The FDNY does not have a formal evaluation process for strategic plan 
performance. Though it assesses objective attainment, it has not published the results 
publicly since 2006, and the internal process is informal. Goals are not presented in a 
measurable format in the plan.   
Attaining objectives designed to achieve a goal intuitively leads one to believe the 
goals are (at least in the process of) being met, but objectives are generally worded as 
outputs, while goals are worded as outcomes. According to Bryson: “Outputs are the 
actual actions, behaviors, products, services, or other direct consequences 
produced…Outcomes are the benefits of the outputs…and the larger meanings attached 
to those outputs.”125 The FDNY has not presented a measurement of goal attainment for 
any individual plan, or over the course of the plans (since the goals have remained 
essentially the same). The goals are also difficult to quantify due to their wording (using 
terms like improve, enhance, strengthen, and increase without specifying to what extent).   
Without a practical application of the strategic plan that can drive performance 
metrics, the plan runs the risk of remaining unfulfilled. The universally recognized adage 
“what gets measured gets done” highlights its importance.126 Edwards stresses that tying 
the strategic planning process with the performance management system of an 
organization “is vital because strategic planning requires good performance information 
                                                 
124 Industrial College of the Armed Forces and National Defense University Press, Strategic 
Leadership and Decision Making, chap. 18, pg. 9. 
125 Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 240. 
126 David Osborne, Reinventing Government : How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the 
Public Sector (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1992), 146. 
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while the creation of performance indicators depend on a clearly defined strategy for the 
organization.”127 Young, Reynolds, and Harris relate: “Without measurement, there is no 
means for feedback and evaluation, and therefore strategies can become stagnant, 
decoupled from their intended effect.”128   
Cohen and Eimicke stress that goals and the activities designed to accomplish 
them require metrics to be meaningful, which they define as operational and resulting in 
actual organizational behaviors, adding, “the measurements should not only demonstrate 
that the goal is being achieved, but should also measure the quality of the goal being 
achieved.”129 A performance indicator’s specificity is based on how general the goal is 
and, ideally, should include both objective and subjective indicators.130   
Determining objective attainment is not a scientific process at the FDNY as 
neither the objectives nor their tasks are weighted to account for difficulty in completion 
(time, funding, manpower) or significance in attaining their stated goals. The objectives 
themselves are difficult to quantify due to their wording and were subjectively appraised 
based on a number of factors, such as number of major milestones achieved or percentage 
of total funding spent out of total money allocated. Objectives that are specific and 
closed-ended (e.g., delivery of new apparatus) are deemed 100% complete when fully 
implemented. Objectives that have a rolling implementation (e.g., specialized training) 
are deemed complete and ongoing when fully developed and implementation has begun 
but will take more than a year to complete.131   
The FDNY used the number of objectives completed as the quantifier of success 
in strategic plan implementation. The objectives presented in the McKinsey report were 
30% completed within two years (34% in three), when the first FDNY strategic plan was 
published. The 2004−2005 plan had the best completion rate, with 30% of objectives 
                                                 
127 Edwards, “Strategic Planning in Local Government,” 26–27. 
128 Young, Reynolds, and Harris, “Organizational Strategic Planning and Execution,” 29. 
129 Steven Cohen and William B. Eimicke, “Management Innovation in Improving Response Time at 
New York City’s Fire Department (FDNY),” paper presented at the Fall Research Conference of the 
Association of Policy Analysis and Management, Baltimore, MD, November 810, 2012, 3. 
130 Ibid., 4. 
131 Meta Ribowsky (FDNY Strategic Planning Unit director), in discussion with author, 2016. 
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complete within two years (95% in three). This number is deceptive, however, as 8 of the 
20 objectives were carried over from the McKinsey report and therefore had a two-year 
head start. Most of the other plans completed between 60% and 80% of their objectives 
within three years. See Appendix C for more information. 
The “Background, Accomplishments, Next Steps and Timeframes, and Lead 
Bureau” format of the first two FDNY strategic plans was a framework for transparent 
and public accountability. However, this transparency may create political opposition; by 
specifying what the organization will do, you are also making it clear what the 
organization will not do. As Cohen and Eimicke indicate: “This can stimulate political 
opposition to the organization and can also stimulate segments of the public and interest 
groups that were previously unaware of the organization’s plans.”132   
The quarterly review process the FDNY implemented with their first plan and 
continues to use today keeps the focus on objective completion and holds the lead bureau/
manager responsible for achieving critical milestones in his or her respective projects. 
Tracking this progress in the Priority Projects Report and distributing it among the senior 
staff also keeps stakeholders focused on attaining objectives.133 This recurring focus has 
been integral to the high percentage of objective attainment in a timely fashion 
throughout the FDNY’s strategic planning history. 
3. Formulation 
The FD-SPP attained a full score in 2 of the 6 formulation components of the 
PSPP, internal analysis at 3.75% and internal stakeholder analysis at 2.67%. The greatest 
potential for positive overall impact was external analysis (not applied by the FDNY) at 
3.20%, followed by formulate overall strategy at 2.40%, external stakeholder analysis at 
2.20%, and formulate goals at 1.70%.   
The FDNY did not complete formal analyses of its current state and successive 
strategic planning started with the previous plan, leading to only incremental 
                                                 
132 Cohen, Eimicke, and Heikkila, The Effective Public Manager, 143. 
133 Meta Ribowsky (FDNY Strategic Planning Unit director), in discussion with author, 2016. 
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improvements. As Hamel and Prahalad note, “The starting point for next year’s strategy 
is almost always this year’s strategy…The company sticks to segments and territories it 
knows, even though the real opportunities may be elsewhere.”134 The FDNY did not 
complete formal external analyses for any of its strategic plans either. Awareness of the 
external environment was implicitly the responsibility of the leaders/bureau heads that 
recommended initiatives.   
The goals listed in the first and succeeding FDNY strategic plans represent a 
categorization of objectives, not desired outcomes. They are vague, not measurable, do 
not have specific actions or timelines, and are stated as categories more than goals. As the 
Department achieved these short-term goals, rebuilding the response capability, it did not 
shift to a longer planning horizon focusing on long-term goals and objectives. The plans 
became stagnant, with the same goals twelve years running.   
The FDNY never specified an overall strategy in any of its strategic plans. The 
initial implicit strategy was to see where the strategic planning process would take it. The 
FDNY implicitly conducts external stakeholder analyses when obtaining approval to 
publish its strategic plans. However, it does not formally conduct analyses of the many 
stakeholders of Department outputs, including other agencies with which it frequently 
interacts (NYPD, NYCEM, DOB, PANYNJ, MTA, etc.) and private/public utility 
companies (Con Edison, Brooklyn Union Gas, etc.), in addition to many others.   
4. Planning 
The FD-SPP scored well in 2 of the 4 planning components of the PSPP, develop 
action plan at 2.80%, and develop implementation plan at 2.40% with little improvement 
needed. The greatest potential for positive overall impact was develop objectives at 
1.60%, followed by generate strategic plan at 1.30%. 
Using the SMART acronym to describe the objectives in the FDNY strategic 
plans, they are clear and specific, actionable, and realistic. The objectives are often not 
measurable or timed or presented in a way that clarifies what and when it takes for them 
                                                 
134 Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad, “Strategic Intent,” Harvard Business Review 83, no. 7/8 (August 
7, 2005): 161. 
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to be successfully attained. The fact that only four strategic plans produced and 
implemented by two commands in the Department is both indicative of the effort and 
perseverance required by their respective leadership and the lack of penetration strategic 
planning made throughout the Department. The polished, professional look of the plans 
that were produced may have discouraged other commands from attempting them. 
5. Pre-formulation 
The FD-SPP performed extremely well in this functional category, attaining a full 
score in 3 of the 4 pre-formulation components of the PSPP, create and agree on process, 
revise/create mission statement, and identify organizational values. The greatest potential 
for positive overall impact was create vision statement (not applied by the FDNY) at 
3.25%. 
The revised mission statement reflected the broader role the FDNY was playing in 
life safety and homeland security, but notably missing from the FDNY’s strategic plan 
process was a specified vision of what and where it wants the organization to be at some 
future point (known as the future state of the organization). Though mentioned in the 
chief of department’s written message at the beginning of the first plan, “the 
Department’s vision is one of partnership between uniformed and civilian members that 
will build on our core competencies to handle all fires, pre-hospital care and emergencies, 
as well as new challenges,” it was not included in the body of the plan nor specified as a 
vision statement in any of the FDNY strategic plans.135 
In contrast to the FDNY strategic plans, the two strategies published by the CTDP 
describe a broad but coordinated effort toward a shared goal. The goals and objectives in 
these plans aligned a cross-section of the Department with a clearly expressed future 
state, incorporating flexible and adaptable components that mitigate problems with the 
strategic planning process. CTDP defined its role as the nexus for preparedness in the 
FDNY, coordinating multiple internal and external stakeholder goals and objectives into 
an overarching vision of emergency preparedness, with both short-term and long-term 
                                                 
135 “FDNY Strategic Plan: 2004–2005,” FDNY, COD Message. 
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strategic planning horizons. CTDP explicated a vision and articulated a process to 
achieve it, with provision for adapting it to the ever-changing threat environment.   
The lack of a vision impacted several strategic planning components at the 
FDNY. It did not encourage long-term thinking and contributed to the short-term goals 
and objectives in the FDNY strategic plans. Without a future state to compare relative 
goal accomplishment, there is no way to quantify the progress or success of the strategic 
plans. Without a vision, goals and objectives are difficult to measure and put on a 
timeline.  
The FDNY did not provide a cohesive vision or strategy that would guide its 
efforts past the next few years. The lack of a specified vision or overall strategy 
combined with a short planning horizon contributed to the short-term goals and 
objectives expressed in the FDNY strategic plans. The combination of a short planning 
horizon, lack of an expressed vision and overall strategy, and short-term objectives could 
characterize the FDNY strategic plans more as action plans than strategic plans.   
6. Implementation 
The FD-SPP scored well in 2 of the 3 implementation components of the PSPP, 
implement action plan and implementation plan both at 2.67% with little improvement 
needed. The greatest potential for positive overall impact was feedback loop at 1.60%. 
Each FDNY strategic planning cycle begins with a list of initiatives from the 
bureaus and commands. This allows for the emergence of innovative ideas and new 
approaches to feedback into the strategic planning process. The FDNY also allows for 
parallel development of concepts that were not ready or able to be included in that cycle’s 
strategic plan, or proposed between planning cycles. Thus, the strategic planning process 
does not squash these ideas or concepts, and if they develop or blossom, they are 
incorporated into future strategic plans. By reaching out to all levels of the organization 
for input in the 2009−2010 and 2011−2013 plans through surveys, the FDNY allowed 
innovative and emergent ideas to be forwarded, though constrained by the breadth and 
hierarchical level from which they were culled, and if they were championed along the 
way.  
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B. SECONDARY ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The degree of variance between the FD-SPP and the BCG-PP relative to the PSPP 
categorized the secondary comparative analysis results. The analysis found FD-SPP 
elements attained a total score of 60% of the PSPP and an average 54% improvement in 
14 of the 20 elements would net a 39% total improvement to match the PSPP. BCG-PP 
elements attained a total score of 87% of the PSPP and an average 26% improvement in 9 
of the 20 elements would net a 12% total improvement to match the PSPP.   
The BCG-PP outperformed the FD-SPP by a wide margin: 87% to 60%. The FD-
SPP did perform better than the BCG-PP in two elements: internal analysis by 40%, and 
internal stakeholder analysis by 20%, likely a result of the limited time BCG had to 
produce the Project Axiom report. The two processes had identical scores in seven of the 
elements. BCG-PP scored higher than FD-SPP in eleven elements. The biggest 
differences between FD-SPP and BCG-PP were inclusion of external perspective, and 
create a vision statement, both not applied by the FDNY and scored 100% by BDC-PP.  
BCG-PP scored 60% higher than FD-SPP in three elements: future orientation, 
formulate overall strategy, and external analysis; 40% higher on four elements: develop 
objectives, broad perspective, formulate goals, and external stakeholder analysis; and 
20% better on two elements: develop strategic plan, and inclusion of managers. As noted 
in the interpretation of primary analysis results, the results are grouped into functional 
categories with the exception of implementation and management, as the BCG Project 
Axiom report was not specifically a strategic plan and the FDNY has yet to implement 
any of its recommendations. This data is presented in Tables 14 and 15. 
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Table 14.   Secondary Comparative Analysis Outcome 
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Table 15.   Secondary Comparative Analysis Outcome Legend 
Code Refers to Code Refers to 
FD FD-SPP score  % Tot 
Attain 
% of total FD-SPP or BCG-PP weighted score attained 
Var PSPP−FD/BCG Wt Imp Needed % improvement in score needed to attain PSPP for element 
BCG BCG-PP score % Total 
Impact 
% total increases if PSPP attained for element 
FD-SPP/BCG-PP Var FD-SPP improvement needed−BCG-PP improvement needed 
 
1. Characteristics 
The BCG-PP scored higher than the FD-SPP in 4 characteristics: inclusion of 
external perspective (not applied by the FDNY) by 100%, followed by future orientation 
by 60%, broad perspective by 40% and inclusion of managers by 20%.   
The quality of the Project Axiom report is a shining example of the benefit of 
external perspective on the strategic planning process, especially when in the form of 
professional, experienced, qualified, respected, and renowned consulting services. BCG 
leveraged its broad experience and vast analytical tools to provide an in-depth analysis. 
BCG defined the demand landscape (what the projected demand for services will be) and 
projected changes through 2030 in an analysis of the past and predicted future trends in 
the FDNY’s core activities: fire, medical, rescue, and disaster insurance. BCG factored in 
the continued risk of terrorism and extreme weather events, a projected decline in fire and 
increase in medical response needs, and the reality of increasing fiscal pressure on the 
nearly $1.67 Billion FDNY operating budget (FY2012).136  
Project Axiom looked broadly at the internal and external environments in which 
the FDNY operates, accounting for the network of interconnected stakeholders that 
impact the FDNY’s current and future success. BCG incorporated this perspective with a 
long-term planning horizon to ensure that the many drivers and controlling factors that 
impact the FDNY are considered when analyzing its current state and projecting multiple 
scenarios for its future state. Project Axiom used a diverse and cross-sectional group of 
FDNY employees to provide input in brainstorming sessions.   
                                                 




The FD-SPP scored higher than the BCG-PP in 2 elements: internal analysis by 
60%, and internal stakeholder analysis by 40%. These scores are most likely the result of 
BCG only spending three months with the FDNY while conducting the research for their 
report. The BCG-PP scored higher than the FD-SPP in 4 components: external analysis 
by 60%, formulate overall strategy by 60%, external stakeholder analysis by 40%, and 
formulate goals by 40%. 
Project Axiom analyzed external opportunities and constraints, incorporating 
political acumen and analytical tools, and analyzing both current and future environments 
in which the FDNY may operate, making recommendations for both. It provided an 
overall strategy that ties in with the vision for the future state of the FDNY, incorporating 
broad and long-term ideas and providing a roadmap to attain the vision.   
BCG conducted significant analysis on the external stakeholders that the FDNY 
needs to embrace in order to prepare for the future environment. The group analyzed the 
community engagement and policy input that would be necessary on local, state, and 
national levels to enable many of its recommendations for future development. Project 
Axiom provided a number of attainable goals toward realizing its vision of FDNY’s 
future state. The goals are specific, measurable, actionable, realistic (though difficult), 
and timed (SMART).  
3. Pre-formulation 
The BCG-PP scored higher than the FD-SPP in one component of this function, 
create vision statement (not applied by the FDNY) by 100%. BCG described a very clear 
vision for the FDNY by the year 2030 in the Project Axiom report: 
 One Department, one family 
 Flexible leader in meeting NYC life safety demands 
 Inclusive community engagement with open-door policy 
 Greater input in policy at the regional, state, and national levels137 
                                                 
137 Boston Consulting Group, Project Axiom, 9, SC3. 
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The vision of a future state was important for BCG due to the 18-year planning horizon 
for Project Axiom, and less important in the FDNY strategic plans due to their short 
planning horizon.   
4. Planning 
The BCG-PP scored higher than the FD-SPP in 1 component of the planning 
function, develop objectives by 40%. Project Axiom listed specific actions the FDNY 
needed to take in order to accomplish the goals required to realize the vision. Because 
Project Axiom was a report and not specifically a strategic plan, it focused on long-term 
and broad recommendations, above the level that requires development of objectives.  
C. PROJECT AXIOM 
The Project Axiom planning process clearly outperformed the FDNY strategic 
planning process in this analysis, attaining 87% of the PSPP elements compared to 60% 
for the FD-SPP. The BCG-PP outscored the FD-SPP in 11 of the 20 elements, tied in 7 of 
20, and the FD-SPP outscored the BCG-PP in 2. These results beg the question: Why did 
the FDNY not implement any of the BCG Project Axiom recommendations to date? 
As is the case with most seemingly simple questions in this environment, there are 
no simple answers. The researcher was unable to get a specific and clear response to 
inquiries on the topic, and posits several theories based on the extensive research 
conducted within the FDNY. These are a combination of information gathered 
informally, an analysis of the internal and external environment at the time, and personal 
(therefore subjective) insight into the question. 
1. Political, Public, and Financial Support 
The post-9/11 environment included virtually universal political and public 
support for the FDNY. Obtaining approval and funding for rebuilding and new initiatives 
was relatively easy. Local, state and federal officials were eager and quick to approve 
FDNY initiatives, though sometimes it was seen as an opportunity to capitalize politically 
on the moment.  
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The high percentage of McKinsey recommendations implemented within two 
years reflects this support, as funding is the easiest way to support, derail, or delay 
objective completion. The FDNY consistently obtained funding through federal 
homeland security grants, a testament to the FDNY’s grant request writers and the value 
of the strategic plans. As time passed without any significant terrorist attacks in the 
United States, political and public support waned. By the time BCG released Project 
Axiom, the environment had changed dramatically, and it was questionable if the 
political and financial support that would have been required to implement the Project 
Axiom recommendations was available.    
2. Leadership Turnover/Election Cycles 
In order to provide the accountability that the public increasingly demands, public 
sector culture is changing to adopt a more corporate philosophy. However, the need to 
maintain services at any cost in the public sector mitigates the strategic concerns of high 
profitability and high company mortality that are so prevalent in the private sector. These 
risks are manifested in the public sector through leadership turnover or reduced funding 
for the organization. This creates a paradox that can cause public sector leadership to be 
more risk-averse, knowing that while great success is rewarded, a high degree of failure 
is instant-death, leading them to create and employ middle-of-the road strategies.138 
The FDNY benefited from a continuity of leadership for many years after 9/11, as 
Mayor Bloomberg was elected to three successive terms (2002−2014) and only had two 
fire commissioners during his tenure: Nicholas Scopetta and Salvatore Cassano, formerly 
chief of department in Commissioner Scopetta’s administration. The FDNY produced 
extraordinary accomplishments over this time period, rebuilding the Department after 9/
11, improving the FDNY’s core competencies in virtually every statistical way, and 
vastly improving the FDNY’s ability to respond to all-hazard events.139  
Turnover in leadership is common with new administrations, and the leadership 
continuity the FDNY enjoyed for twelve years after 9/11 is rare. The four-year election 
                                                 
138 Raynor, The Strategy Paradox, 1368. 
139 Robert Sweeney, “FDNY Stands Prepared and Ready to Meet Any Challenge,” WNYF, 2011, 6. 
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cycle creates an uncertainty that can inhibit strategic planning, since political leaders’ 
temporal perspective tends to align with that cycle. By the time a new administration 
takes control and is able to introduce its priorities and objectives (and realize some 
results), the political machine has to start gearing up for the next election cycle.140 
Focusing on a long-term planning horizon that extends past the current election cycle can 
be difficult in this environment.   
The leadership turnover/election cycle can also inhibit implementation of 
innovative, game-changing ideas of significant impact. The political capital required to 
overcome numerous internal and external barriers to change can cost leaders the support 
required to implement the short-term initiatives necessary for maintaining incremental 
performance improvement.     
The FDNY began evaluating the recommendations in 2013, the last year of the 
FDNY Strategic Plan 2011−2013, during which the next strategic plan would normally 
be formulated. But the 2013 mayoral election loomed and a change of administration was 
inevitable (Mayor Bloomberg had already extended his mayoralty past the previous term 
limit). Knowing the next strategic plan would apply to the incoming administration in 
2014, the FDNY did not formulate it in 2013. 
3. External Stakeholders 
The Project Axiom recommendations called for radical change to the FDNY with 
enormous hurdles to overcome. The vision BCG presented would require significant 
changes in regulations; federal, state, and private insurance reimbursement; state 
regulations, and labor contracts. The support of the rank-and-file, labor unions, city 
government, state regulators, local politicians, and federal agencies would be necessary 
and difficult to obtain. 
4. Project Axiom Conclusions 
The Project Axiom report explicated a vision, utilized a long-term planning 
horizon (eighteen years), and included broad and diverse input from over fifty people in a 
                                                 
140 Young, Reynolds, and Harris, “Organizational Strategic Planning and Execution,” 29. 
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cross-section of the FDNY. BCG synthesized ideas with in-depth analysis to produce 
creative, innovative, strategic options that the FDNY could evaluate for implementation. 
The inertia caused by pending leadership turnover secondary to the election cycle and the 
monumental effort required to take on the extraordinary challenges at great political risk 
kept Project Axiom recommendations from being implemented.  
Having BCG produce analysis at the level of Project Axiom pro bono was a coup 
for the FDNY. Consulting at this elite level is very expensive, and the FDNY may not 
have been able to fund it, nor would it be able to do so on a regular basis in the future. 
The next administration formulated the FDNY strategic plan after Project Axiom (FDNY 
Strategic Plan 2015−2017), yet barely addressed its recommendations, with only three of 
the twenty-four plan objectives touching on Project Axiom recommendations (one short-
term, one intermediate, and one long-term). Though Project Axiom presented in-depth, 
professional, strategically oriented recommendations, they have not been embraced by 
the FDNY, essentially wasting a rare opportunity.   
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter interpreted the results of the comparative analysis in Chapter IV, 
categorized by the impact they would have on the total planning process if improved. 
Primary analysis interpretation reviewed the results of the FD-SPP/PSPP comparison, 
describing why elements met or failed to meet the PSPP standards. Secondary analysis 
interpretation reviewed the results of FD-SPP/BCG-PP comparison, describing and 
interpreting the gaps between the FD-SPP and BCG-PP performance in those elements.     
Chapter VI lists recommendations developed from this analysis and interpretation,  
sorted into the same five of the same six functional categories: pre-formulation, 
formulation, planning, implementation, and management, with characteristics added to 
their associated function. 
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Chapter V evaluated the results from the qualitative comparative analysis 
performed in chapter IV, subjectively interpreting cause and effect for the strategic 
planning process elements requiring improvement. This chapter combines the results 
from Chapters IV and V, formulating recommendations based on overall positive impact 
to the strategic planning process, relative costs associated with the recommendation, and 
the perceived effort required to implement it.   
The recommendations are sorted within the functional categories used throughout 
this thesis: pre-formulation, formulation, planning, implementation, and management, 
with the exception of characteristics, which are incorporated into the category they most 
impact. The primary outcome matrix for recommendations includes the functional 
categories with characteristics added, as shown in Tables 16 and 17. 
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Pre-Formulation               5.82% 5 
Create and Agree on Process 3.50% 5.25 5 5.25 0.00 3.50% 0% 0.00%   
Create Vision Statement 3.25% 4.88 0 0.00 4.88 0.00% 100% 3.25% 2 
Revise/Create Mission Statement 4.50% 6.75 5 6.75 0.00 4.50% 0% 0.00%   
Identify Organizational Values 3.00% 4.50 5 4.50 0.00 3.00% 0% 0.00%   
Leadership Support/Involvement 3.25% 4.88 5 4.88 0.00 3.25% 0% 0.00%   
Broad Perspective 2.67% 4.00 3 2.40 1.60 1.60% 40% 1.07% 17 
Future Orientation 2.50% 3.75 2 1.50 2.25 1.00% 60% 1.50% 15 
Formulation               16.80% 3 
Internal Analysis 3.75% 5.63 5 5.63 0.00 3.75% 0% 0.00%   
External Analysis 4.00% 6.00 1 1.20 4.80 0.80% 80% 3.20% 4 
Internal Stakeholder Analysis  2.67% 4.00 5 4.00 0.00 2.67% 0% 0.00%   
External Stakeholder Analysis 3.67% 5.50 2 2.20 3.30 1.47% 60% 2.20% 6 
Formulate Overall Strategy  4.00% 6.00 2 2.40 3.60 1.60% 60% 2.40% 5 
Formulate Goals 4.25% 6.38 3 3.83 2.55 2.55% 40% 1.70% 11 
Inclusion of Lower-Level Staff 2.00% 3.00 1 0.60 2.40 0.40% 80% 1.60% 14 
Inclusion of Managers 3.25% 4.88 2 1.95 2.93 1.30% 60% 1.95% 8 
Inclusion of Leaders 3.50% 5.25 5 5.25 0.00 3.50% 0% 0.00%   
Include External Perspective 3.75% 5.63 0 0.00 5.63 0.00% 100% 3.75% 1 
Planning               4.20% 4 
Develop Strategic Plan 3.25% 4.88 3 2.93 1.95 1.95% 40% 1.30% 16 
Develop Objectives 4.00% 6.00 3 3.60 2.40 2.40% 40% 1.60% 12 
Develop Action Plan 3.50% 5.25 4 4.20 1.05 2.80% 20% 0.70% 19 
Develop Implementation Plan 3.00% 4.50 4 3.60 0.90 2.40% 20% 0.60% 24 
Implementation               2.93% 6 
Include Feedback Loop  4.00% 6.00 3 3.60 2.40 2.40% 40% 1.60% 13 
Implement Action Plan 3.33% 5.00 4 4.00 1.00 2.67% 20% 0.67% 21 
Implementation Plan 3.33% 5.00 4 4.00 1.00 2.67% 20% 0.67% 22 
Management               9.65% 2 
Targets (Milestones) 3.00% 4.50 2 1.80 2.70 1.20% 60% 1.80% 9 
Accountability 3.33% 5.00 4 4.00 1.00 2.67% 20% 0.67% 23 
Evaluate Goal/Object Attain 3.00% 4.50 2 1.80 2.70 1.20% 60% 1.80% 10 
Evaluate Outcomes 3.25% 4.88 0 0.00 4.88 0.00% 100% 3.25% 3 
Evaluate Benchmarks  2.67% 4.00 1 0.80 3.20 0.53% 80% 2.13% 7 
Report Externally 2.75% 4.13 5 4.13 0.00 2.75% 0% 0.00%   
Total 87% 150 90 91 59 61% 55% 32%   
       
Average 
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Table 17.   Primary Outcome Matrix for Recommendations Legend 
Code Refers to Code Refers to 
%Wt That element % of total  Var PSPP−FD-SPP Wt 
PSPP PSPP weighted score  % Tot Attain FD-SPP Wt / PSPP total 
FD FD-SPP score  Improve Needed % FD-SPP score increase needed to attain PSPP 
FD Wt FD-SPP weighted score  % Total Impact % total increases if PSPP attained 
 
A. PRE-FORMULATION 
1. Extend and Tier the Strategic Planning Horizon 
 Impact: 1.50% overall (future orientation) 
 Cost: negligible 
 Difficulty: moderate 
This thesis recommends the FDNY extend its planning horizon to short-term 
(one–two years), medium-term (five years), and long-term (ten years) for each strategic 
plan. Short-term focuses on goals that have been prioritized for near-term implementation 
utilizing existing funding and resources allocated to upcoming objectives. Medium-term 
focuses on goals that require more than two years to implement and obtain funding, or 
resources requiring more than two years to obtain, including authorization and funding 
for increased staff and capital budget purchases. Long-term focuses on a vision of the 
future state of the organization in ten years and the decisions, sources of funding, legal or 
governmental policy, that need to be addressed in the next two to five years to begin to 
set up for success. Extending the planning horizon has the added effect of encouraging 




2. Develop a Vision Statement 
 Impact: 4.32% overall  
 Create vision statement: 3.25% 
 Broad perspective: 1.07% 
 Cost: negligible 
 Difficulty: significant 
Developing a vision statement that articulates a desired future state of the 
organization within the planning horizon provides an over-arching framework for 
Department-wide strategy and direction for the strategic plan goals and objectives. The 
vision should apply to the long-term planning horizon of ten years, providing the 
temporal framework for the strategic planning process. The vision should be updated as 
plans are revised and new ones are created, accommodating changes in the environment. 
As Satell writes: “Often, a vision has a shelf life. It works for a while and then outlives its 
usefulness.”141 Implementing this recommendation will be difficult, as it requires 
significant compromise and collaboration to obtain consensus among multiple leaders, 
stakeholders, and managers. 
3. Continue Process, Mission, Values, Leadership Support 
 Impact: 0% change, 11% overall  
 Continue Process: 3.50% 
 Mission Statement: 4.50% 
 Organizational Values: 3.00% 
 Cost: minimal 
 Difficulty: minimal 
Though difficult at first, agreeing on the planning process, developing a mission 
statement, and identifying organizational values has stood the test of time and are still 
relevant today. The planning process should implement the recommendations in this 
chapter. The mission statement and organizational values should be reviewed every five 
                                                 
141 Satell, “Evolution of Strategy,” 2. 
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years to ensure they reflect what the FDNY is doing at the time. Continued leadership 
support is critical to the success of strategic planning in the FDNY. 
B. FORMULATION  
1. Formulate an Overall Strategy to Achieve the Vision 
 Impact: 2.40% overall (formulate overall strategy) 
 Cost: negligible  
 Difficulty: significant 
Defining the strategy provides a framework for the development of goals to 
realize the vision, and for decision-making on objectives and tactics to accomplish it. A 
well-defined strategy is also necessary to create appropriate performance metrics for the 
evaluation of both Department and strategic plan performance.142 Implementing this 
recommendation will be difficult, as it requires significant compromise and collaboration 
to obtain consensus among multiple leaders, stakeholders, and managers. 
2. Increase and Broaden Input and Inclusion 
 Impact: 7.30% overall  
 Include external perspective: 3.75% 
 Inclusion of managers: 1.95% 
 Inclusion of lower-level staff: 1.60% 
 Cost: high if external consulting, low if not 
 Difficulty: moderate 
Several recommendations combine to have a significant positive impact on the 
overall strategic planning process by broadening input and inclusion at the FDNY.   
a. Include External Perspective 
Including external perspective had the greatest potential impact of all the elements 
in the strategic planning process, at 3.75%. The quality of the McKinsey and BCG 
reports highlights the benefit of external perspective. The experience and tools outside 
                                                 
142 Edwards, “Strategic Planning in Local Government,” 27. 
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consultants of this caliber bring are unmatched within public safety organizations. Yet the 
benefit of external perspective is not confined to experience and tools; it is often simply 
having a different set of eyes—unencumbered by the tradition, culture, and history of the 
organization—view a problem and recommend a solution. The FDNY should bring 
competent members of other agencies into the process and offer to do the same for those 
organizations.   
b. Increase/Broaden Inclusion in Strategic Plan Workgroup 
The FDNY should revert to the two-tiered planning group concept (POC/AG and 
PWG) that it used for its first four plans, and expand the PWG to include representatives 
from all bureaus and significant commands. Incorporate the McKinsey and BCG 
practices of multiple interviews and brainstorming sessions. Implementation may be 
resisted, as strategic planning can inherently reduce executive power by encouraging 
involvement throughout the organization, empowering others to make decisions. This 
shifts some decision-making to the participants and away from upper management.143  
c. Strategic Plan from Bureaus and Commands 
Elicit input from all bureaus and commands with an electronic fillable “mini-
strategic plan” form designed to encourage strategic thinking and align bureau or 
command planning with the overall strategic plan. Hold designated bureau heads or 
commanders responsible and accountable for completion at specific intervals aligned 
with the strategic planning process.  
d. Supervisor/Manager Survey 
Elicit input from all supervisors with an electronic fillable survey emailed to 
them, designed to encourage participation and provide an avenue for the supervisors to 
express ideas to leaders and planners without being filtered through the normal chain-of-
command approval process.   
  
                                                 
143 Young, Reynolds, and Harris, “Organizational Strategic Planning and Execution,” 85. 
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e. All-Employee Survey 
Elicit input and feedback from all employees via an electronic survey at the 
mandated yearly medicals. All members already complete three health surveys, adding an 
additional one at the same time would not seem as intrusive as a distinct and separate 
survey, and expected compliance would be much higher. Ensuring all bureaus have the 
opportunity to participate could leverage support for this survey, generating metrics 
applicable to their goals. For example, a fifty-question survey could include ten questions 
from each of five bureaus. Respondents should be assured that survey results will be 
blind, but the data should be able to be categorized to functional area and title. Every 
member of the department would participate yearly. The data points generated would 
provide feedback for as many bureaus and commands that participated and better inform 
policy and procedure. 
3. Continue Internal Analysis, Internal Stakeholder Analysis, Inclusion 
of Leaders   
 Impact: 0% change, 7.75% overall  
 Internal Analysis: 3.75% 
 Internal Stakeholder Analysis: 2.67% 
 Inclusion of Leaders: 3.50% 
 Cost: minimal 
 Difficulty: minimal 
The FDNY is keenly aware of their core competencies and internal capacity and 
capabilities. Leadership remains an integral part of the strategic planning process. 
Formalizing and documenting internal analyses would improve the process. 
C. PLANNING  
Recommendations to improve elements of the planning functional category are 
addressed in the “Management” recommendations section (Section E). 
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D. IMPLEMENTATION  
1. Project Axiom Analysis  
 Impact: significant  
 Cost: negligible  
 Difficulty: moderate 
The following two implementation recommendations arose from the secondary 
analysis—specifically, from exploring why the BCG Project Axiom recommendations 
were not implemented. Though they do not have impact percentage assigned to them, 
Project Axiom scored 27% higher than the FD-SPP overall (comparing the same 
elements to the PSPP).   
a. Align Planning Cycle with Election Cycle/Renew Every Two Years 
 Cost: negligible 
 Difficulty: moderate 
Aligning the FDNY strategic plans to begin one year into each election cycle, and 
renewing the plan every two years, allows the new administration time to formulate its 
plan and two years to implement it before starting the process anew. Short-term goals 
extend one year into the next administration, medium- and long-term goals are course-
corrected every two years and extend into the next administration and beyond. The entire 
strategic planning process would not have to be completed every two years, and the 
review/revision of vision, mission, and values should occur every other plan (four years), 
falling one year into each administration.   
b. Pursue Alternate Revenue Sources 
 Cost: moderate 
 Difficulty: moderate 
The FDNY should consider alternate revenue sources by exploring Project Axiom 
recommendations to increase the Department’s adaptability and flexibility of service, 
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maximizing its value to the city and its citizens.144 As Project Axiom indicates, the 
FDNY should leverage its unparalleled brand appeal and other marketable qualities, in 
addition to its unique competencies that could give it competitive advantage in the 
evolving threat and medical environments. Implementing this recommendation will be 
moderately difficult, as it requires consensus among the multiple leaders, stakeholders, 
and managers. 
2. Feedback Loop 
 Impact: 1.60% overall  
 Cost: negligible  
 Difficulty: moderate 
The feedback loop in the FD-SPP is built in to the accountability process and in 
each planning cycle. Though the FDNY does an excellent job allowing both mid-course 
alterations and parallel development of initiatives that were not included in the strategic 
plan, this process should be formalized and documented more thoroughly.   
3. Continue Action and Implementation Plans 
 Impact: 1.34% change, 6.66% overall  
 Implement Action Plan: 0.67% 
 Organizational Values: 0.67% 
 Cost: minimal 
 Difficulty: moderate 
Implementing the recommendations in the strategic plans is a strong point for the 
FDNY. They need little improvement and should continue on their same course. 
E. MANAGEMENT  
Management of the strategic planning process, by nature, touches many parts of 
the process and is a nebulous concept at the FDNY. Other than the director of the 
Strategic Planning Unit (a unit staffed by one, the aforementioned director), there is no 
                                                 
144 Boston Consulting Group, Project Axiom, 56, 58, SC1 Appendix. 
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overriding or coordinating body that ensures the process of strategic planning effectively 
continues in this large organization. Remarkably, the process does continue—a testament 
to the process that was put in place eleven years ago and to the commitment leadership 
has made to its concept.   
1. Expand and Rename the FDNY Strategic Planning Unit 
 Impact: 20.28% 
 Analysis: 5.4% 
 Planning: 5.9% 
 Evaluation: 8.98% 
 Cost: moderate 
 Difficulty: significant 
The FDNY should expand the Strategic Planning Unit and rename it the 
“Strategic Management” Unit, taking on all the functions related to the strategic planning 
process. The impact of this recommendation would be tremendous, as it would positively 
impact 11 of the elements in the PSPP with a potential 20.28% improvement in total. The 
second and third order outcomes of implementing this recommendation are incalculable.   
Up-and-coming leaders in the FDNY should staff the expansion. They  would do 
two-year rotations corresponding with the planning cycle, providing them with an 
opportunity to gain a more global perspective of the FDNY and ownership of a specific 
strategic plan, and providing the Strategic Management Unit with field perspective.   
Expanding and developing a dedicated strategic management unit can support and 
facilitate strategic thinking throughout the strategic planning process. It can research, 
collate, analyze, and provide relevant data and topical information at any point in the 
process. The unit can help formulate strategy, articulate the strategy as a plan, and 
disseminate the plan throughout the organization.  
Grant studied the ten leading oil and gas oil majors (as listed in the 1997 Fortune 
Global 500) and noted that “all of the companies possessed a corporate staff unit 
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responsible for strategic planning headed by a vice president or a director of corporate 
planning or strategy,” whose functions included: 
 Provide technical and administrative support to strategic management 
activities; 
 Prepare market, economic and political forecasts, competitor analysis, risk 
analysis and other research of the business environment to assist planning 
through the company; 
 Foster communication and dialog between corporate and business 
management; and 
 Act as internal consultants concentrating expertise about strategy analysis 
and strategic planning techniques.145 
Mintzberg indicates strategic planners should “supply the analysis or hard data 
that strategic thinking requires…they should act as catalysts…aiding and encouraging 
managers to think strategically. They can be programmers of a strategy, helping to 
specify the series of concrete steps needed to carry out the vision.”146 The Strategic 
Management Unit would have four functions: analysis, planning, evaluation, and 
facilitation.   
The following recommendations are not predicated on the primary management 
recommendation to expand and rename the strategic planning unit. They should be 
considered even if the primary recommendation is not. However, implementing the 
primary recommendation would facilitate implementation of all of them.   
a. Analysis (Formulation) 
 Impact: 5.40% overall 
 External analysis: 3.20% 
 External stakeholder analysis: 2.20% 
 Cost: moderate 
 Difficulty: moderate 
                                                 
145 Robert M. Grant, “Strategic Planning in a Turbulent Environment: Evidence from the Oil Majors,” 
Strategic Management Journal 24, no. 6 (June 2003): 496, 500–501, doi:10.1002/smj.314. 
146 Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” 108. 
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There are four elements of the PSPP that involve analysis, all of which could be 
handled by the Strategic Management Unit: internal and external analysis, and internal 
and external stakeholder analysis. The FD-SPP attained 100% scores in both internal 
analyses, as the contributors to the process were acutely aware of internal capability and 
capacity. The Strategic Management Unit could focus on the external environment with 
analytical capability, experience, and responsibility that would ensure both external 
analyses not currently performed within the FD-SPP are accomplished.   
b. Planning (Formulation and Planning) 
 Impact: 5.90% overall 
 Formulate goals: 1.70% 
 Develop objectives: 1.60% 
 Develop strategic plan: 1.30% 
 Develop action plan: 0.70% 
 Develop implementation plan: 0.60% 
 Cost: low 
 Difficulty: moderate 
There are five elements of the PSPP that dedicated planners in the Strategic 
Management Unit could ensure are accomplished appropriately and professionally: 
formulate goals, develop strategic plan, develop objectives, develop action plan, and 
develop implementation plan. Having dedicated, trained, and experienced planners would 
facilitate completion of these elements, ensuring that they coordinate with the overall 
plan. This is especially important with developing goals and objectives (as opposed to 
formulating them), ensuring they comply with the SMART acronym (specific, 
measurable, actionable, realistic, and timed) so metrics can be established to properly 
evaluate the process.  
c. Evaluation (Management) 
 Impact: 8.98% overall 
 Evaluate outcomes: 3.25% 
 Evaluate benchmarks: 2.13% 
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 Targets (milestones): 1.80% 
 Evaluate goal/objective attainment: 1.80% 
 Cost: moderate 
 Difficulty: moderate 
There are six elements that fall under the evaluation role that the Strategic 
Management Unit could perform: accountability and report externally are already being 
handled well by the FD-SPP. Evaluate outcomes and benchmarks both have very high 
potential impact if improved, and evaluate targets (milestones) and goal/objective 
attainment also could have significant impact if improved. Having a dedicated unit with 
the experience and tools to monitor and keep track of the metrics required to objectively 
assess and report on these elements would help ensure they were on schedule and on 
target, and allow leaders to hold responsible parties accountable.  
 Evaluate outcomes. It is important that FDNY evaluate outcomes in 
addition to outputs. Outcomes are what is actually being accomplished—
what the FDNY is getting done, not just what it is doing. Evaluating 
outcomes is the only way to determine the successful accomplishment of 
goals. 
 Evaluate benchmarks. The Strategic Planning Unit can evaluate FDNY 
performance benchmarks while conducting the external analysis.  
 Targets (milestones). The Strategic Planning Unit would monitor and track 
performance to target on attaining objectives and accomplishing goals. 
 Qualify goal accomplishment. In order to evaluate outcomes, goals must 
be presented in a way that they can be qualifiedly measured. Outcome 
metrics for goal accomplishment or a cumulative measure of weighted 
objective attainment must be established.  
 Quantify objective attainment. In order to evaluate objective attainment, 
output metrics or a cumulative measure of weighted task attainment must 
be established. 
d. Facilitation 
 Impact: not quantifiable 
 Cost: moderate 
 Difficulty: moderate 
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The Strategic Management Unit would facilitate cross-sectional and multi-level 
communication, collaboration, and education on strategy and strategic thinking. The Unit 
should define the concepts of strategy and strategic plan/planning, assisting and educating 
employees at all levels when they should be used in a document or presentation. They 
should monitor information flow throughout the FDNY to discover when the concepts are 
being used incorrectly, and correct and educate those who do so. This would help to 
reduce confusion regarding the terms and ensure that all parts of the FDNY are 
appropriately applying them.   
The strategic management unit should be certified in the use of planning 
techniques and structured planning tools designed to encourage strategic thinking, 
increase strategic awareness, and help formulate solutions to a range of potential futures 
the FDNY may face. The unit should conduct exercises utilizing these tools with diverse, 
cross-sectional groups of managers and leaders. They should explore leveraging existing 
computer-based planning exercise programs that allow managers and leaders to 
participate asymmetrically, reducing the need to meet at a specific place or time. The 
Unit should incorporate these tools and its knowledge of them into group discussions and 
brainstorming sessions in the strategic plan formulation aspect of the strategic planning 
process. 
2. Continue Accountability and Report Externally 
 Impact: 0.67% change, 6.08% overall  
 Accountability: 0.67% 
 Report Externally: 0.00% 
 Cost: minimal 
 Difficulty: minimal 
Accountability has been a cornerstone of the FD-SPP, with the quarterly review 
process ensuring responsible managers keep projects on target, though several have 
slipped through the cracks. Formalizing and documenting the accountability process 
would provide increased motivation and metrics to analyze the strategic plan’s 
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performance. The FDNY prints and distributes copies of their strategic plans, and posts 
electronic copies on their website.   
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented recommendations for improving the strategic planning 
process at the FDNY along with an explanation of their impact, cost, and difficulty to 
implement. The recommendations are listed within the five functional categories used 
throughout this thesis, though several of them overlap other functional areas. 
Implementing these recommendations will align the FDNY strategic planning 
process elements with those in the preferred strategic planning process.   
G. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis explored the strategic planning process at the FDNY during the fifteen 
years since September 11, 2001, providing significant insight into the process developed 
and implemented in a unique public service agency in a unique environment. Many 
lessons can be taken from this research that may be applied in other public service 
agencies. More comparative research is required on different approaches from different 
agencies in different environments.   
Additionally, there is a real shortage of research on the effectiveness of strategic 
planning in public service agencies. Though legitimate opinions abound regarding this 
topic, there is very little true research on the efficacy of the process. More research is 
needed to provide empirical evidence for the practice of strategic planning in public 
service agencies and whether it should be continued, expanded, or discontinued in the 
future.   
H. CONCLUSIONS 
Strategic planning at the Fire Department of the City of New York was born out 
of the tragedy of 9/11, when 343 of its members paid the ultimate sacrifice, along with 
over 2,400 other innocent people. It continues today as FDNY members continue to pay 
with their lives, a total of 127 since 9/11 (as of September 2016) as a result of illnesses 
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secondary to working at ground zero, along with hundreds of other innocent people.147 
The FDNY made a commitment to strategic planning to help guide the organization 
through the dramatic changes required to adequately respond to the new asymmetric 
threat that accompanied the post-9/11 era. The Department continues its commitment to 
strategic planning to navigate the continuous improvement necessary to adequately 
respond to the constantly evolving threat and demand environment in the future. 
The research question of this thesis was: How did the FDNY develop and 
implement formal strategic plans in the context of their unique operating environment 
after September 11, 2001, and what changes are required to ensure its relevance in 
current and future environments? In response to a recommendation in the McKinsey & 
Company report, Increasing the FDNY’s Preparedness, the FDNY developed and 
implemented a strategic planning process that produced a formal strategic plan. This 
process combines elements of the pre-active and re-active strategy formulation categories 
defined in the literature review. It is explicit in that goals and objectives are delineated in 
a formal plan, and implicit in that a vision of the future state and an overall strategy are 
not elucidated in the formal plan; and it is emergent in that there is a built-in feedback 
loop within each planning cycle. The process, little changed since its inception, has 
produced a total of five FDNY strategic plans over the past twelve years.   
The all-hazard environment in which the FDNY operates continues to evolve after 
9/11. Significant weather events, including blizzards, hurricanes, and Super Storm Sandy, 
have challenged the FDNY’s capabilities and magnified the threat of global climate 
change. Terrorism keeps evolving; the use of fire as a weapon and active shooter tactics 
push the boundaries of the FDNY’s response paradigms. Its core responsibilities are 
changing, with fire-related incidents dropping steadily and medical incidents rising 
significantly. Additionally, the FDNY continues to experience mission creep into other 
domains of public service, including a significant increase in building inspection 
responsibilities and reported natural gas leaks.   
                                                 




The FDNY has risen to all these challenges, analyzing and adapting to threats, 
innovating and adopting new technology, improvising and adjusting tactics, and 
modifying and amending operations. However, in the twelve years since its first strategic 
plan, strategic planning at the FDNY has not evolved to include a long-term perspective 
with future-oriented goals and effective performance metrics to stay ahead of the 
evolving environment. 
Current theories on strategic planning consider the planning process itself as more 
important to the organization than the plans they produce. The process can encourage and 
facilitate strategic thinking throughout the FDNY. By improving strategic thinking the 
FDNY can develop the important combination of creative and analytical perspective in 
leaders and managers to synthesize strategies for its future. The recommendations all 
focus on improving the strategic planning process and strategic thinking. Implementing 
them will re-align strategic planning, allowing it to create more effective strategic plans 
and encourage strategic thinking now and in the future. The revised process that results 
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APPENDIX A.  ANNUAL RETIREMENT RATE 
 
Data retrieved from internal FDNY documents. WTC for 2004–2005 were not included in WTC average 
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APPENDIX B.  PARTICIPATION BY HIERARCHY 
 
 
* Participant 2004−05 2007−08 2009−10 2011−13 2015−17 
1 
Fire Commissioner (FC) POC POC AG AG SPG 
Counsel and Senior Policy Advisor     SPG 
Chief Diversity/Inclusion Officer     SPG 
2 
First Deputy FC   AG AG SPG 
Chief of Department POC POC AG AG SPG 
Chief of Staff     SPG 
3 
Deputy FC of Legal and Intergovernmental 
Affairs and Management Initiatives 
PWG PWG PWG PWG SPG 
Deputy FC of Strategic Planning and 
Policy 
  AG AG SPG 
Deputy FC of Technology and Support 
Services 
  PWG PWG  
Deputy FC of Public Information   PWG PWG SPG 
Deputy FC of Administration     SPG 
4 
Assistant Commissioner of Budget and 
Finance 
  PWG PWG  
Assistant Commissioner of External Affairs     SPG 
Chief of Fire Operations   AG AG  
Chief of EMS  PWG AG AG  
Assistant Chief of Operations   PWG PWG  
5 
Assistant Chief/Deputy Assistant Chief 
(DAC) Borough Commander 
PWG−2 PWG−2    
DAC of Planning and Strategy PWG−2 PWG AG AG  
DAC of Counterterrorism and Emergency 
Preparedness 
 PWG    
6 
Associate Commissioner for Management 
Initiatives 
PWG PWG    
Associate Commissioner for 
Intergovernmental Affairs 
 PWG    
Director of Management Analysis and 
Planning 
PWG PWG    
Director of Strategic Planning PWG PWG AG AG SPG 
 
POC Planning Oversight Committee PWG  Planning Work Group 
AG Accountability Group PWG-2  Two participants of title 
 Title did not exist at that time SPG Strategic Planning Group 
*   Hierarchical grouping based on FDNY organization chart at that time 
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  Response Operations/Service Delivery 
  Health and Safety 
  Planning, Management, Organizational Development 
  Diversity and Inclusion 
  
Fire Prevention/Safety Education, Community Engagement 
 
  Not Started 
  In Progress 
  Completed 
 
McKinsey Recommendations—Released August 2002 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
McKinsey FD 1   
M 1 Operationally           
M 1.1 Expand use of the Incident Command System     FD1.1.1     
M 1.2 Further develop the Fire Department Operations Center     FD1.6.1     
M 1.3 Create Incident Management Teams     FD1.1.1     
M 1.4 Create and fully deploy a flexible recall procedure     FD1.1.2     
M 1.5 Seek formal mutual aide agreements for Fire Operations     FD1.1.3     
M 1.6 Modify and enforce staging protocols           
M 1.7 Expand Hazmat/Heavy Rescue/Marine capabilities     FD1.1.4 FD1.1.5   
M 2 Planning and Management           
M 2.1 Enhance planning/management processes, create POC           
M 2.1.1 Produce formal Annual Plan to track and manage performance           
M 2.1.2 Track progress of ongoing FDNY initiatives           
M 2.1.3 Approve new initiatives throughout the year           
M 2.2 Expand and reorganize the Operational Planning Unit           
M 2.2.1 Conduct a comprehensive risk assessment           
M 2.2.2 Develop and maintain an FDNY All-Hazards Emergency Response Plan           
M 2.2.3 Expand technical capabilities-maps, org charts, databases           
M 2.2.4 Lead inter-agency coordination at the operational level           
M 2.2.5 Continue to perform existing operational support functions           
M 3 Improve communications and technology capabilities           
M 3.1 Revamp the Communications and Technology Management Process           
M 3.2.1 Improve communications capabilities           
M 3.2.2 Improve ability to receive and disseminate critical incident information           
M 3.2.3 Give chief officers at incident scenes better information and  personnel tracking           
M 3.2.4 Improve EMS's capability to track patients during large-scale incidents           
M 4 Enhance system to provide family and member support services           





FD 1 FDNY Strategic Plan One: 2004–2005—Released March 2004 
2004 2005 2006 
FD 1   
FD 1.1 Improve Emergency Response Operations        
FD 1.1.1 Continue integration of Incident Command System and Incident Management Teams       
FD 1.1.2 Further develop and automate the Department's comprehensive recall program       
FD 1.1.3 Enhance the Department's mutual-aid program       
FD 1.1.4 Enhance the capabilities of the Special Operations Command (SOC)       
FD 1.1.5 Increase Marine capabilities to respond to heightened environment/increased water-borne traffic       
FD 1.1.6 Enhance preparedness planning to address new threats and complex, long-term challenges       
FD 1.2 Enhance Health and Safety of FDNY Members       
FD 1.2.1 Develop an improved Firefighter/EMS injury and fatality prevention and investigation program       
FD 1.2.2 Develop an enhanced Fire/EMS apparatus accident prevention and reduction program       
FD 1.2.3 Develop standards to meet training needs of Firefighters, EMTs/Paramedics, Fire and EMS Officers       
FD 1.3 Strengthen Management and Organizational Development       
FD 1.3.1 Determine EMS/Fire Operations more efficiently managed to improve performance and service        
FD 1.3.2 Increase the managerial capabilities and expertise though advanced leadership development       
FD 1.3.3 Provide more comprehensive support services to FDNY families and members       
FD 1.4 Increase Diversity       
FD 1.4.1 Develop a comprehensive written plan incorporating ongoing and new recruitment initiatives       
FD 1.4.2 Develop/expand outreach/mentorship to target minority young adults/women interest in FF/EMS       
FD 1.5 Improve Fire Prevention and Safety Education       
FD 1.5.1 Develop new safety requirements and evacuation plan procedures for high-rise buildings       
FD 1.5.2 Integrate fire prevention/safety education projects to ensure messages reach communities at risk       
FD 1.6 Advance Technology       
FD 1.6.1 Complete upgrade of the Fire Department Operations Center (FDOC)       
FD 1.6.2 Develop electronic wireless command post boards        
FD 1.6.3 Obtain a computerized unit deployment and tracking model for Fire and EMS resources       





FD 2  FDNY Strategic Plan Two: 2007–2008—Released February 2007 
2007 2008 
FD 2 
FD 2.1 Improve Emergency Response Operations     
FD 2.1.1 Implement initiatives recommended by the Fire/EMS Integration Plan Task Force      
FD 2.1.2 Develop Network-Centric Command to provide Incident Commanders with on-scene critical information     
FD 2.1.3 Extend and enhance training for Probationary Firefighters     
FD 2.1.4 Training to ensure maintenance and sustainability of core/newly acquired specialized competencies     
FD 2.1.5 Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) to ensure continuous and uninterrupted delivery of critical services     
FD 2.2 Enhance Health and Safety of FDNY Members     
FD 2.2.1 Provide World Trade Center monitoring of active and retired members     
FD 2.2.2 Enhance operational safety management and behavior     
FD 2.2.3 Develop procedures to apply water to live electricity at Consolidated Edison facilities     
FD 2.3 Strengthen Management and Organizational Development     
FD 2.3.1 Implement an enhanced Performance Management System for mission-critical functions     
FD 2.3.2 Develop a Battalion Chief Training Day program and a Deputy Chief Development program     
FD 2.3.3 Develop a Department-wide internal communication strategy/restructuring and utilizing new technologies     
FD 2.4 Increase Diversity     
FD 2.4.1 Continue targeted recruitment for future FF civil service exams: young men/women of diverse backgrounds     
FD 2.4.2 Develop/implement ongoing targeted recruitment for EMS to maintain/increase diverse young men/women      
FD 2.4.3 Expand outreach/mentoring in diverse communities: increase visibility/FDNY career opportunities FF/EMS     
FD 2.5 Improve Fire Prevention and Safety Education     
FD 2.5.1 Implement new safety requirements and evacuation plan procedures for commercial high-rise buildings     





FD 3  FDNY Strategic Plan Three: 2009–2010—Released May 2009 
2009 2010 
FD 3 
FD 3.1 Improve Emergency Response Operations     
FD 3.1.1 Research/pilot/expand new/innovative FF techniques enhance operational tactics, response, ICS     
FD 3.1.2 Advance electronic FF Locator, component of  a Electronic Incident Management System     
FD 3.1.3 Improve on-scene handie-talkie mayday tracking     
FD 3.1.4 Expand the Marine Operations’ capacity for emergency response     
FD 3.1.5 Improve the survivability of cardiac patients through public service prepare continuum     
FD 3.1.6 Initiate FDNY New York City Project Hypothermia     
FD 3.1.7 Improve survivability from CO and cyanide toxicity due to smoke inhalation     
FD 3.1.8 Improve EMS response to patients suffering from cyanide toxicity     
FD 3.2 Enhance the Health and Safety of FDNY Members     
FD 3.2.1 Further promote operational safety management and behavior by reinforcing the FDNY safety culture     
FD 3.2.2 Implement “green” initiatives Department-wide     
FD 3.2.3 Continue the World Trade Center Medical Monitoring and Treatment Programs     
FD 3.3 Strengthen Management and Organizational Development     
FD 3.3.1 Develop “Coordinated Building Inspection and Data Analysis System” (CBIDAS)     
FD 3.3.2 Establish a Leadership Development Program for Staff Chiefs     
FD 3.3.3 Continue NIMS/NRF/improve overall comm w/in Dept., kiosks at firehouse and EMS stations     
FD 3.3.4 Continue to evaluate the EMS career ladder within the Department     
FD 3.4 Increase Diversity     
FD 3.4.1 Targeted recruitment for future FF civil service exams: young men/women of diverse backgrounds     
FD 3.4.2 Develop/implement ongoing targeted recruitment for EMS to increase diverse young men/women      
FD 3.4.3 Expand outreach/mentoring in diverse communities: increase visibility/FDNY career opportunities     
FD 3.5 Improve Fire Prevention and Safety Education     
FD 3.5.1 Implement a risk-based inspection program     
FD 3.5.2 Continue to implement the review and approval of EAPs for commercial high-rise buildings     





FD 4  FDNY Strategic Plan Four: 2011–2013—Released May 2011 
2011 2012 2013 
FD 4 
FD 4.1 Improve Emergency Response Operations       
FD 4.1.1 Key tech projects and expand network ops (CBIDAS, Electronic Riding List, EFAS, ECB, ePCR)       
FD 4.1.2 Develop a five-year strategic plan for the Bureau of Communications       
FD 4.1.3 Increase FDNY representation at the regional, national, and international levels       
FD 4.1.4 Continue to implement the FDNY 2010 Strategic Plan       
FD 4.1.5 Expand terrorism and disaster preparedness training though intra-and inter-agency exercises       
FD 4.2 Enhance the Health and Safety of Members       
FD 4.2.1 Promote the FDNY "culture of safety" to reduce accidents and injuries       
FD 4.2.2 Continue the World Trade Center Medical Monitoring and Treatment Program       
FD 4.2.3 Improve member's physical health and develop  a wellness and prevention program to prevent illness       
FD 4.3 Strengthen Management and Organizational Development       
FD 4.3.1 Further leadership capability through management training opportunities  FOMI, ALC, CLP, NPS       
FD 4.3.2 Leadership training for EMS Officer, joint FF/EMS training to improve comm and coord medical        
FD 4.3.3 Develop a Technology Strategic Plan        
FD 4.4 Increase Diversity       
FD 4.4.1 Advance recruitment, retention, promotion for men/women of diverse background in FF/EMS       
FD 4.5 Improve Fie Prevention and Safety Education       
FD 4.5.1 Expand fire safety program to increase safety among  special populations, including the disabled       





FD 5  FDNY Strategic Plan Five: 2015–2017—Released September 2015 
2015 2016 
FD 5 
FD 5.1 Safety: The Public, Firefighters and EMTS and Paramedics     
FD 5.1.1 Outreach community,  agencies, private/non-profit awareness/participate FD fire/life safety resources      
FD 5.1.2 Integrated inj reporting data, med records, WTC monitoring, work comp, disability track trends     
FD 5.1.3 Upgrade customer service, inspect unit for daycare facilities, improve fire safety business services     
FD 5.1.4 Deploy new apparatus, monitoring and metering devices, PPE, thermal imaging for firefighting     
FD 5.1.5 Expand executive/master's programs, college-equivalent in-house ed, joint programs      
FD 5.1.6 Establish Risk Management Group (Fire/EMS OPS, BOT, Safety, BFP, BHS, MAP, BTDS)     
FD 5.2 Integrate Fire and EMS to Enhance the FDNY's Ability to Deliver Emergency Medical Service     
FD 5.2.1 Add EMS tours in high-resp areas, Officers to manage EMS facilitate Fire/EMS ops at incidents     
FD 5.2.2 Automate notification create EMS “decision dispatcher” co-locate dispatchers by borough     
FD 5.2.3 Reduce response times to priority 1–3 calls by expanding role and availability of FD first responders     
FD 5.2.4 Collaborate with DoITT to complete FDCAD and integrate Fire and EMS dispatching at both PSACs     
FD 5.2.5 Develop public/private partnerships provide options for non-life threatening emergencies     
FD 5.3 Diversity and Inclusion     
FD 5.3.1 Enhance FDNY Cadet, mentorship programs, provide additional opportunities to inc. diversity     
FD 5.3.2 Enlist experts to train all staff inclusion/diversity, promote value of diverse workforce     
FD 5.3.3 Identify additional recruitment sources to increase ranks of women, people of color and veterans      
FD 5.3.4 Increase upper-rank diversity thru mentorship, leadership; expand higher ed; detail assignments     
FD 5.3.5 Monitor effectiveness of recruit efforts  objective metrics and set expectations to meet future goal     
FD 4.1 Improve Service Delivery     
FD 5.4.1 Update guidelines/exp ICS Officers, Batt/Div staff; exp mentor prog, prof development for EMS     
FD 5.4.2 Expand mobile tech for data entry, collection, analysis, comp training; advanced modeling      
FD 5.4.3 Online customer links/auto processes BFP materials, payments, permits; share inspect info in Dept.     
FD 5.4.4 Expand tech rescue new challenges (gas responses, residential high-rises, harbor, waterway, terrorist)     
FD 5.5 Community Engagement     
FD 5.5.1 Open EMS Stations and Firehouses to community  for public education about fire and life safety     
FD 5.5.2 Robust Community Affairs Team imp community ties, communicate diverse pop.     
FD 5.5.3 Expand community-based public ed pgm: CPR, first aid, imp health, help each other in emergency     






Plan Total Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Comp Tot % Y1 % Y2 % Y3 % Y4 % Y5 % 
McKinsey2  23 3 7 1 3 5 19 83% 13% 30% 4% 13% 22% 
FD SP1 20 3 3 13     19 95% 15% 15% 65% 0% 0% 
FD SP2 16 6 4 1 1   12 75% 38% 25% 6% 6% 0% 
FD SP3 21 9 4 0 1 2 16 76% 43% 19% 0% 5% 10% 
FD SP4 14 6 3 2     11 79% 43% 21% 14% 0% 0% 
FD SP5 24 8 3       11 46% 33% 13% 0% 0% 0% 
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APPENDIX D.  DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Strategic Consequential, organization-wide, long-term, and complex 
Goal 
Broad, general, tangible and descriptive outcome that is 
measurable and designed to be accomplished within a 
timeframe (usually 3–5 years) toward realization of the vision 
Objective 
Specific, measurable, actionable, realistic, time-bound 
(SMART) output to be attained within a timeframe (usually 
1–2 years) toward accomplishment of the goal 
Initiatives Introductory steps to a new proposal 
Tasks Assigned work to a person, team, or unit 
Tactics Methods used 
Strategic Thinking 
Analytical and creative ability to synthesize multiple inputs 
into organization-wide outputs such as vision, strategy, 
mission, and values 
Strategic Plan 
A set of broad goals designed to realize the vision within the 
context of the mission, constrained by the values, and 
determined by doctrine  
Action Plan 
A set of specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-
bound (SMART) objectives designed to attain the goals of the 
strategic plan 
Implementation Plan 
A set of tasks designed to attain the objectives of the action 
plan, who is responsible, and what milestones must be met 
Evaluation Plan 
The review process including cadence, metrics for success, 
and process for adaption 
Strategic Planning 




Strategic Thinking + Strategic Planning  
Strategic Management Coordination of the strategic planning process 
Vision The desired end state of the organization to be realized 
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APPENDIX E.  LITERARY SOURCES FOR WEIGHTING MATRIX 
A number of literature sources referenced in developing the elements of the 
preferred strategic planning process are listed here. 
Boyd and Reuning-Elliott: Seven Practices  
 Mission statements 
 Trend analysis 
 Competitor analysis 
 Long-term and short-term goals 
 Action plans 
 Ongoing evaluation 
They later conclude that two of the indicators, trend analysis and 
competitor analysis, have a lower reliability rating AND are not a reliable 
measure.148 
Bryson: Strategy Change Cycle 
 Initiate and agree on a strategic planning process 
 Identify organizational mandates 
 Clarify organizational missions and values 
 Assess the external and internal environments 
 Identify the strategic issues facing the organization 
 Formulate strategies to manage the issues 
 Review and adopt the strategies or strategic plan 
 Establish an effective organizational vision 
 Develop an effective implementation process 
 Reassess strategies and the strategic planning process149 
  
                                                 
148 Boyd and Reuning-Elliott, “A Measurement Model of Strategic Planning,” 184. 
149 Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 32–34. 
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Poister and Streib: Strategic Planning Big Picture   
 Is concerned with identifying and responding to the most fundamental 
issues facing an organization 
 Addresses the subjective question of purpose and the often competing 
values that influence mission and strategies 
 Emphasizes the importance of external trends and forces as they are likely 
to affect the agency and its mission 
 Attempts to be politically realistic by taking into account the concerns and 
preferences of internal, and especially external, stakeholders 
 Relies heavily on the active involvement of senior-level managers and 
sometimes elected officials, assisted by staff support where needed 
 Requires the candid confrontation of critical issues by key participants to 
build commitment to plans 
 Is action oriented and stresses the importance of developing plans for 
implementing strategies 
 Focuses on implementing decisions now in order to position the 
organization favorably for the future150 
Edwards: Most-Cited Components 
 Plan for strategic planning 
 State organizational mission/vision/values 
 Assess external and internal environments (SWOT) 
 Stakeholder assessment 
 Identify and analyze issues facing the organization 
 State goals for how the organization will face issues 
 Create strategies for reaching goals 
 Assess feasibility of strategies 
 Create and implement action plans151 
  
                                                 
150 Poister, Pitts, and Edwards, “Strategic Management Research in the Public Sector.” 
151 Edwards, “Strategic Planning in Local Government,” 20–28. 
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Edwards: Comprehensive Strategic Planning Processes 
 General management capacity 
 Good leadership 
 Broad participation 
 Inclusion of essential elements 
 Broad dissemination 
 Integration with performance management practices, budgeting, and 
human resource management 
 Evaluate, monitor, and update process152 
Young, Reynolds, and Harris: Ten Steps to Strategic Planning 
 Define planning activities and assignments 
 Outline basic content of plan document 
 Schedule, organize, and facilitate working sessions with staff and external 
stakeholders 
 Collect information and prepare background materials for use by the 
working groups 
 Record and sum up working session discussions and decisions 
 Draft strategic plan document 
 Maintain regular communication with management, keep staff and 
partners informed of planning activities and results153 
Young, Reynolds, and Harris: Six Essential Elements 
 Development of a mission statement 
 Assessment of the organization’s external needs 
 Creation of strategic objectives 
 Outcome measurement 
 Strategies 
 Performance feed-forward 
 External outcome, rather than internal outputs, focus154 
                                                 
152 Ibid., 18. 
153 Young, Reynolds, and Harris, “Organizational Strategic Planning and Execution,” 91. 
154 Ibid., 88. 
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Young, Reynolds, and Harris: Five Essential Factors  
 Constructive discontent with the status quo 
 Measurement of external results 
 Leadership and consensus building within the agency 
 Collaboration and partnership with stakeholders  
 Commitment to finish executing the strategic plan155 
TCC Group: Ten Keys to Successful Strategic Planning for Nonprofit and 
Foundational Leaders 
 A clear and comprehensive grasp of external opportunities and challenges 
 A realistic and comprehensive assessment of the organization’s strengths 
and limitations 
 An inclusive approach 
 An empowered planning committee 
 Involvement of senior leadership 
 Sharing of responsibility by board and staff members 
 Learning from best practices 
 Clear priorities and an implementation plan 
 Patience 
 A commitment to change 
TCC Group: Ten Keys, Ten Years Later 
 Agree on the reason for planning 
 Create a clear CEO vision for the organization 
 Develop a strong board–staff relationship based on candor and open 
communication 
 Use data to help ground decision making 
 Increase impact by using all the tools in your toolbox 
 Learn from the experience of others—good and bad 
 Define success and decide how to hold yourself accountable 
 Understand your place in the ecosystem in which you operate 
                                                 
155 Ibid., 63. 
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 Assess organizational strengths and challenges 
 Remember that a strategic plan includes a roadmap for implementing the 
decisions156 
Steurer and Martinuzzi: Characteristics of Strategic Public Management 
 Formal strategy documents completed by flexible strategy processes 
(embracing formal and informal mechanisms) 
 Strategies and plans developed by those responsible for implementation 
(ideally by involving external stakeholders) 
 Cross-sectoral strategic structures, and mechanisms 
 Implementation as an integral part of strategy process 
 Multi-stakeholder approach facilitates acceptance and ownership of 
strategy process 
 Monitoring, progress reports, external evaluations, and peer reviews 
support learning in strategy process 
 Nonlinear strategic thinking157 
Bram F. Noble: Defining Characteristics 
 Leads to strategy for action  
 Set in context of broader vision, goals, and objectives 
 Asks “what is the preferred process?” 
 Backcasts, then forecasts 
 Proactive 
 Non project–specific 
 Broad focus and low level of detail158 
  
                                                 
156 “Ten Keys Ten Years Later,” TCC Group, accessed September 10, 2016, http://www.tccgrp.com/
pubs/ten_keys_ten_years.php. 
157 Reinhard Steurer and André Martinuzzi, “Towards a New Pattern of Strategy Formation in the 
Public Sector: First Experiences with National Strategies for Sustainable Development in Europe,” 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 23, no. 3 (June 1, 2005): 467, doi:10.1068/c0403j. 
158 Bram F. Noble, “Strategic Environmental Assessment: What Is It? & What Makes It Strategic?,” 
Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy & Management 2, no. 2 (June 2000): 204. 
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APPENDIX F.  COMPARATIVE MATRIX 




PSPP FDNY/PSPP BCG/PSPP FDNY/BCG 
Wt% PSPP FD Wt Var BCG Wt Var FD BCG Var 
Pre-formulation             
Create and Agree on Process 0.035 5 5 5 0 5 5 0 5 5 0 
Create Vision Statement 0.033 5 0 0 5 5 5 0 0 5 5 
Revise/Create Mission Statement 0.045 7 5 7 0 5 7 0 7 7 0 
Identify Organizational Values 0.030 5 5 5 0 5 5 0 5 5 0 
Formulation            
Internal Analysis 0.038 6 5 6 0 4 5 1 6 5 -1 
External Analysis 0.040 6 1 1 5 4 5 1 1 5 4 
Internal Stakeholder Analysis  0.027 4 4 3 1 5 4 0 3 4 1 
External Stakeholder Analysis 0.037 6 2 2 3 5 6 0 2 6 3 
Formulate Overall Strategy  0.040 6 2 2 4 5 6 0 2 6 4 
Formulate Goals 0.043 6 4 5 1 5 6 0 5 6 1 
Planning            
Generate Strategic Plan 0.033 5 4 4 1 5 5 0 4 5 1 
Develop Objectives 0.040 6 5 6 0 5 6 0 6 6 0 
Develop Action Plan 0.035 5 4 4 1 5 5 0 4 6 2 
Develop Implementation Plan 0.030 5 4 4 1 5 5 0 4 5 1 
Include Feedback Loop  0.040 6 3 4 2 *Not included in analysis 
Implementation            
Implement Action Plan 0.033 5 4 4 1       
Implementation Plan 0.033 5 3 3 2       
Management            
Targets (milestones) 0.030 5 2 2 3       
Responsibility 0.033 5 4 4 1       
Evaluate Goal/Object Attain 0.030 5 3 3 2       
Evaluate Outcomes 0.033 5 0 0 5       
Evaluate Benchmarks  0.027 4 1 1 3       
Report Externally 0.028 4 4 3 1       
Characteristics            
Leadership Support/Involvement 0.033 5 5 5 0       
Future Orientation 0.025 4 2 2 2 5 4 0 2 4 2 
Broad Perspective 0.027 4 3 2 2 5 4 0 2 4 2 
Inclusion of Leaders 0.035 5 5 5 0 3 3 2 5 3 -2 
Inclusion of Managers 0.033 5 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 1 
Inclusion of Lower Level Staff 0.020 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 
Inclusion of External Perspective 0.038 6 0 0 6 4 5 1 0 5 5 
Total 1 150 92 94 56 89 92 10 66 93 28 
Comparison   FDNY/PSPP  56 BCG/PSPP 10 FDNY/BCG 28 
 
 112 
Table 19.   SPP Comparative Analysis Matrix Legend 
 
Code Refers to Score Implemented/Quality 
PSPP Preferred Strategic Planning Process 0 Not at all/not applicable 
Wt% Weighting percentage based on PSPP  1 Barely 
Wt Weighted outcome of score to left of column 2 Partially 
Var Variance of weighted score to PCPP score 3 Somewhat 
Var2 Variance of weighted FDNY score to BCG score 4 Mostly 
BCG Boston Consulting Group (Project Axiom) 5 Fully 
*  Was not part of BCG report (since it was not a plan) BCG used FDNY’s existing 
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